Deandre Markee King v. United States, 41 F.4th 1363

In 2012 Deandre King participated in an armed bank robbery; FBI evidence led to his arrest and indictment on multiple counts including armed bank robbery and a § 924(c) firearms charge.
King pled guilty to a reduced two-count information: conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 371 and a § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii) firearms count that relied on conspiracy as the predicate “crime of violence.”
His plea agreement included a broad waiver of the right to appeal or to collaterally attack his conviction and sentence (including § 2255 motions), but preserved the right to challenge any § 924(c) sentence exceeding 84 months; the district court sentenced King to 135 months total (51 + 84).
After the Supreme Court held § 924(c)’s residual clause unconstitutional in United States v. Davis (2019) and the Eleventh Circuit held Davis retroactive on collateral review (In re Hammoud), King sought permission to file a second § 2255 based on Davis.
The district court denied the § 2255, concluding King’s collateral-attack waiver barred the claim; the Eleventh Circuit affirmed, holding the waiver — made knowingly and voluntarily — foreclosed a Davis-based collateral attack because none of the narrow exceptions to enforcement applied.

Issue	King’s Argument	Government’s Argument	Held
Whether a valid collateral-attack (appeal) waiver bars a § 2255 claim based on a new, retroactive constitutional rule (Davis).	Davis invalidates the predicate for King’s § 924(c) conviction, so the waiver should not bar relief.	Waivers knowingly and voluntarily entered are enforceable against collateral attacks; future changes in law do not undo a valid waiver.	The waiver bars King’s Davis-based § 2255 claim; enforce the plea waiver.
Whether King’s Davis claim fits the exception for sentences “in excess of the maximum penalty provided by statute.”	If conspiracy can no longer be a § 924(c) predicate, King’s § 924(c) conviction is not a crime and therefore his sentence is statutorily unauthorized.	The statutory-maximum exception refers to the maximum in effect at sentencing, not a moving target altered by later decisions.	The exception does not apply; King’s 84‑month § 924(c) term was below the statutory maximum at sentencing.
Whether a miscarriage-of-justice / actual-innocence exception allows relief despite the waiver.	(Argued in concurrence) Davis renders conviction unlawful so waiver should not bar a miscarriage-of-justice claim.	King admitted at plea colloquy to armed robbery; he cannot show actual innocence of the predicate offense the government could have used.	Even assuming such an exception existed, it would not apply here because King cannot show actual innocence.

United States v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 2319 (2019) (held § 924(c)’s residual clause unconstitutionally vague)
Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591 (2015) (held ACCA residual clause void for vagueness)
United States v. Bushert, 997 F.2d 1343 (11th Cir. 1993) (established enforceability of knowing, voluntary collateral‑attack waivers and narrow exceptions)
United States v. Rubbo, 396 F.3d 1330 (11th Cir. 2005) (contracts/prior‑expectation approach to plea‑agreement interpretation)
United States v. Howle, 166 F.3d 1166 (11th Cir. 1999) (waiver of appeal rights must be enforced to preserve plea bargain certainty)
Brown v. United States, 942 F.3d 1069 (11th Cir. 2019) (conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery does not qualify as a § 924(c) “crime of violence” after Davis)
In re Hammoud, 931 F.3d 1032 (11th Cir. 2019) (held Davis retroactive on collateral review)
Oliver v. United States, 951 F.3d 841 (7th Cir. 2020) (held Davis claims do not avoid valid collateral‑attack waivers)
Portis v. United States, 33 F.4th 331 (6th Cir. 2022) (affirmed that waivers cover future changes in law; statutory‑maximum exception tied to time of sentencing)
DiFalco v. United States, 837 F.3d 1207 (11th Cir. 2016) (waivers cover difficult and debatable legal issues)