Deal v. Commissioner of Correction, 475 Mass. 307

Petitioners (Deal, Golston, Roberio) are juvenile homicide offenders serving mandatory indeterminate life sentences who qualified, via the Department of Correction's objective point-based classification, for minimum security placement.
After the Legislature amended G. L. c. 119, § 72B (July 25, 2014) to forbid categorical bars to minimum security placement for youthful offenders serving life sentences, the Department nevertheless maintained a practice of denying minimum placement to lifers unless they first received a positive parole vote.
The Department used discretionary override codes (notably R and S) and a prior non-discretionary restriction (code E) to block transfers; the assistant deputy commissioner rejected unanimous classification-board recommendations for minimum placement for each petitioner, citing override codes.
Petitioners sought judicial relief arguing the Department’s practice violated § 72B by effectively adding a parole-vote prerequisite and also violated their constitutional right to a "meaningful opportunity" for release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation under the Eighth Amendment and art. 26 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.
The single justice reserved and reported the matter to the full court. The court concluded the Department’s practice violates § 72B because it functions as a categorical bar and fails to perform individualized suitability evaluations; the court rejected the constitutional challenge.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Dept. practice requiring a positive parole vote before minimum security placement violates G. L. c. 119, § 72B	§72B forbids categorical bars; objective qualifying score should trigger individualized consideration for minimum placement, so parole-vote requirement unlawfully adds a condition	Dept. says it has discretion; longstanding practice reserves minimum beds for those with discharge dates and requires a positive parole vote before transfer	Court: §72B requires individualized, case-by-case consideration; Dept. may not use overrides (or practice) to categorically bar lifers from minimum security pending a positive parole vote; Dept. must provide written, case-specific rationales when denying transfer
Whether Dept. practice violates juvenile lifers' constitutional right to a "meaningful opportunity" for parole release	Dept. blocking minimum placement prevents lifers from demonstrating suitability for parole and thus denies a meaningful opportunity for release	Dept. contends parole process remains available and some juvenile lifers have received parole and minimum placement; security level is not a constitutionally protected entitlement	Court: No constitutional violation; there is no protected expectation of release after serving a statutory portion of sentence; Diatchenko does not require automatic parole or release at end of a defined minimum period

Diatchenko v. District Attorney for the Suffolk Dist., 466 Mass. 655 (Mass. 2013) (Eighth Amendment/art. 26 prohibits mandatory life without parole for juveniles; meaningful opportunity for release)
Diatchenko v. District Attorney for the Suffolk Dist., 471 Mass. 12 (Mass. 2015) (procedural protections for juvenile lifers in parole process)
Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (U.S. 2010) (Eighth Amendment forbids life without parole for nonhomicide juvenile offenders; requires meaningful opportunity for release)
Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (U.S. 2012) (mandatory life without parole for juveniles unconstitutional)
Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1 (U.S. 1979) (no inherent constitutional right to parole release)
Quegan v. Massachusetts Parole Bd., 423 Mass. 834 (Mass. 1996) (no constitutional right to conditional release)