De La Fuente v. South Carolina Democratic Party
164 F. Supp. 3d 794
D.S.C.2016Background
- De La Fuente filed timely notice of candidacy and paid the $2,500 fee to the South Carolina Democratic Party (SCDP); the SCDP Executive Council declined to certify him on Dec. 7, 2015.
- SCDP’s Delegate Selection Plan limited certification to candidates “generally acknowledged or recognized in news media throughout the United States” and “actively campaigning for the South Carolina Democratic presidential primary.”
- De La Fuente sued (Feb. 2, 2016) seeking declaratory relief and a preliminary injunction ordering the Party to notify the State to place him on the Feb. 27, 2016 primary ballot (or to delay the primary).
- Court held a preliminary-injunction hearing Feb. 24, 2016; De La Fuente later amended the complaint and agreed to dismiss Secretary of State Hammond and the State Election Commission defendants.
- Court applied the Winter/Real Truth preliminary-injunction standard and treated the requested relief as a mandatory injunction (disfavored). The court denied the injunction principally on laches and also found no likelihood of success on the merits or irreparable harm.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether SCDP’s refusal to certify De La Fuente for the primary ballot violated due process/vagueness principles | SCDP’s media-recognition/active-campaigning standard is vague, arbitrary, and deprived him of Fourteenth Amendment process | The standard is a legitimate, sufficiently specific means to limit ballot access and avoid frivolous candidates; Executive Council applied it reasonably | Court: No likelihood of success; the standard is not unconstitutionally vague as applied and Council did not act arbitrarily |
| Whether SCDP’s action constitutes state action for § 1983 purposes | De La Fuente assumed party action is state action and sued under § 1983 | Defendants relied on state law structure but court assumed state-action for purposes of the motion without deciding | Court assumed state action for this motion but denied relief on other grounds |
| Whether racial discrimination/equal-protection claim supports relief | De La Fuente alleged exclusion based on Hispanic status (all certified candidates were non-Hispanic) | Defendants: no factual allegations showing discriminatory intent or disparate treatment | Court: Conclusory allegations insufficient; no likelihood of success on equal-protection claim |
| Whether equitable factors (irreparable harm, balance of equities, public interest) warrant a preliminary injunction or delay of the primary | De La Fuente argued exclusion causes irreparable injury to his ballot-access rights and sought immediate relief | Defendants stressed extreme prejudice, disruption of ballots (military/overseas ballots mailed), and laches given delay in filing and pursuit | Court: Denied. Found De La Fuente’s delay unreasonable (laches), irreparable harm not clearly shown, equities and public interest favor denying injunction |
Key Cases Cited
- Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7 (2008) (plaintiff must show likelihood of success and irreparable harm for injunction)
- Real Truth About Obama, Inc. v. FEC, 575 F.3d 342 (4th Cir.) (vacated on other grounds) (reiterating Winter standard in Fourth Circuit preliminary-injunction analysis)
- Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428 (1992) (balancing test for burdens on voting rights)
- Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972) (state may regulate number of candidates on ballot to avoid burden and confusion)
- Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983) (election regulation balancing and ballot-access principles)
- Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981) (color-of-state-law/state-action framework for § 1983 claims)
- Kay v. Austin, 621 F.2d 809 (6th Cir. 1980) (upholding media-recognition standard as not void for vagueness)
- LaRouche v. Sheehan, 591 F. Supp. 917 (D. Md. 1984) (upholding media-recognition criteria and discretion in selection as constitutional)
- In re Microsoft Corp. Antitrust Litig., 333 F.3d 517 (4th Cir. 2003) (mandatory injunctions are disfavored and subject to exacting scrutiny)
