Dc Association of Chartered Public Schools v. District of Columbia
277 F. Supp. 3d 67
| D.D.C. | 2017Background
- Plaintiffs (two D.C. charter schools and an association) challenge D.C. funding practices as violating the School Reform Act (SRA) and the Home Rule Act, arguing the District provides non-formula funding to DCPS that advantages DCPS over charter schools.
- The SRA requires annual payments for operating expenses to DCPS and each charter school determined by a uniform per-student formula, but leaves "operating expenses" undefined and delegates creation of the formula to local officials.
- D.C. implemented the Uniform Per Student Funding Formula (UPSFF): DCPS receives a lump-sum annual payment (based on projected/audited estimates) while charter schools receive quarterly payments (adjusted by audited enrollment) and may receive supplemental allocations.
- District also makes non-formula appropriations (supplemental appropriations to DCPS, separate contributions to the Teachers’ Retirement Fund, appropriations to DGS for facilities/repairs, and other non-formula services). Plaintiffs challenge certain non-formula payments and the enrollment-count methodology.
- This Court previously dismissed the Supremacy Clause claim and left Home Rule Act and SRA claims. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the Court resolves: whether SRA forbids non-formula appropriations; whether differing enrollment-count methods violate SRA; and whether the Council’s power to amend SRA should be addressed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether D.C. may make non-formula appropriations (e.g., supplemental DCPS funds, Teachers’ Retirement contributions, DGS appropriations) outside the UPSFF | SRA requires a single, exclusive annual formula payment covering all "operating expenses;" other payments circumvent the formula and are unlawful | SRA establishes a uniform per-student baseline but does not prohibit additional or separate appropriations; local budgetary authority and longstanding practice permit non-formula funding | Court: Held for Defendant — SRA text and legislative history do not clearly require exclusivity; district may make non-formula appropriations and Skidmore-style deference to D.C.'s longstanding practice is appropriate. Defendant's summary judgment granted on these claims. |
| Whether use of different enrollment-count methodologies for DCPS (projected/audited lump sum) and charters (quarterly/audited adjustments) violates the SRA | Different methodologies produce unequal funding and breach the "uniform" formula requirement | Methodologies reflect statutory scheme and budgetary realities; charters are not injured by DCPS windfalls | Court: Plaintiffs lack Article III standing on this claim (no concrete injury shown). Court declines to reach merits. |
| Whether the D.C. Council has authority under the Home Rule Act to amend or repeal provisions of the SRA that apply only to the District (implicating whether Council action could validate D.C. funding practices) | Plaintiffs imply that Council lacks power to defeat SRA protections and that SRA controls | D.C. asserts Home Rule powers permit interstitial local legislation and amendment/repeal in some circumstances | Court: Did not resolve due to dispositive rulings above; declines to decide scope of Council’s amendment authority. |
| Standard of judicial deference to D.C. interpretations of SRA term "operating expenses" | Plaintiffs: statute is clear; no deference warranted | D.C.: statute ambiguous; long-standing implementation and local expertise merit deference (Skidmore-like) | Court: Applied interstitial/deference framework (Skidmore) and found D.C.'s consistent practice persuasive; granted D.C. deference on scope of "operating expenses." |
Key Cases Cited
- Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (summary judgment standard)
- Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (summary judgment and drawing inferences)
- Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (agency deference framework)
- Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (degree of deference to persuasive agency interpretations)
- Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (Article III standing — concreteness requirement)
- Hancock v. Urban Outfitters, Inc., 830 F.3d 511 (statutory-violation standing must show concrete harm)
- Maryland & D.C. Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. Washington, 442 F.2d 123 (municipal regulation not precluded simply because legislature acted in same subject)
- Firemen’s Ins. Co. of Washington v. Washington, 483 F.2d 1323 (local government may legislate interstitially to fill statutory gaps)