Day v. Wilcox Landscaping, Inc.
N15C-06-277 AML
| Del. Super. Ct. | Feb 28, 2017Background
- Sallie Mae hired Wilcox Landscaping to provide snow/ice removal at its Newark facility for winter 2013–2014; Wilcox subcontracted work to Carrow and Sleepy Hollow.
- On January 21, 2014 a storm began after Ms. Day arrived at work; snow accumulated during the day (about 11 inches by storm end). No snow/ice was present before the storm.
- During the storm, sidewalks had been salted but the parking lot was not salted until after the storm ended and the lot was plowed. Ms. Day slipped on ice in the parking lot while it was still snowing and was injured.
- Ms. Day sued Wilcox (and later Carrow and Sleepy Hollow) for negligence for failing to inspect, warn, maintain, and remove snow/ice; defendants moved for summary judgment invoking the continuing storm doctrine.
- The Superior Court concluded as a matter of law that the continuing storm doctrine applies to independent contractors retained by a landowner, precluding liability here, and granted defendants’ motions for summary judgment.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does the continuing storm doctrine apply when snow-removal is performed by an independent contractor? | Day: doctrine shouldn't apply to independent contractors; they can be liable for waiting or incomplete efforts. | Defs: doctrine protects landowners and their contractors; policy and precedent extend it to third parties. | Court: Doctrine applies to independent contractors; they may await storm end without breaching reasonable care. |
| Do contractual duties create a separate tort duty that avoids the continuing storm doctrine? | Day: Wilcox’s contract to clear parking lots created enforceable duties to act during the storm. | Defs: contractual obligations do not override the doctrine; contractors’ duties under contract are subject to the same reasonableness standard. | Court: Contractual duties do not defeat the doctrine; contractors can await storm end under same rule. |
| Does Restatement (Second) of Torts § 324A impose liability for an undertaken snow-removal service that increased risk or was relied upon? | Day: §324A creates liability for the defendants’ undertaking and failures. | Defs: §324A is about failures to exercise reasonable care; the doctrine defines waiting as reasonable, so §324A does not help Day. | Court: §324A does not circumvent the continuing storm doctrine; defendants acted reasonably as a matter of law. |
| Is there a duty to perform pre-storm preventative treatment (e.g., pretreat/salt) that defendants breached? | Day: public policy and being paid to perform the service require accountability for failure to pretreat. | Defs: No common-law duty to pretreat; contract did not authorize or require pretreatment. | Court: No recognized duty to pretreat; argument fails and does not overcome the doctrine. |
Key Cases Cited
- Hamm v. Ramunno, 281 A.2d 601 (Del. 1971) (adopting the continuing storm doctrine in Delaware)
- Young v. Saroukos, 185 A.2d 274 (Del. Super. 1962) (early Delaware adoption of the continuing storm rule)
- Cash v. E. Coast Prop. Mgmt., Inc., 7 A.3d 484 (Del. 2010) (applying the continuing storm doctrine to a landowner and a retained third party)
- Woods v. Prices Corner Shopping Ctr. Merch. Ass'n, 541 A.2d 574 (Del. Super. 1988) (landowner duty for weather-related conditions and application of reasonableness standard)
- Brzoska v. Olson, 668 A.2d 1355 (Del. 1995) (summary judgment evidence and inference standards)
- Merrill v. Crothall Am., Inc., 606 A.2d 96 (Del. 1992) (procedural standard on summary judgment)