160 F. Supp. 3d 1303
N.D. Ala.2016Background
- Plaintiff Willie J. Dawson sued Wal‑Mart asserting multiple employment claims: race discrimination (§ 1981), age discrimination (ADEA), disability discrimination (ADA), and retaliation.
- Dawson pleaded mixed‑motive theories (multiple alleged unlawful reasons) rather than alleging any single factor as the sole "but‑for" cause for his termination.
- Wal‑Mart moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state ADEA, ADA, and retaliation claims because Dawson did not plead "but‑for" causation as required by controlling precedent.
- The court treated this case as effectively identical to Savage v. Secure First Credit Union, which raised the same legal issues and was pending on appeal in the Eleventh Circuit.
- The court dismissed Dawson’s ADEA, ADA, and retaliation claims with prejudice for failing to allege but‑for causation, but allowed the § 1981 race claim to survive because it does not require but‑for causation; the court stayed the case pending the outcome of Savage.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether ADEA liability may proceed under a mixed‑motive theory or requires but‑for causation | Dawson contends age was one of the motivating reasons for termination (mixed motive) | Wal‑Mart argues Gross precludes mixed‑motive ADEA claims; plaintiff must plead age was the but‑for cause | Court: ADEA claims require but‑for causation (dismissed because Dawson did not plead but‑for) |
| Whether ADA claims can proceed without alleging but‑for causation | Dawson advanced a mixed‑motive ADA theory (disability as one motivating factor) | Wal‑Mart argues ADA claims require the plaintiff to allege disability was the but‑for cause (pattern instructions’ "main reason" language insufficient) | Court: ADA claim dismissed with prejudice for failure to plead but‑for causation |
| Whether retaliation claims require but‑for causation after Nassar | Dawson alleged retaliation as one possible motive | Wal‑Mart argued Nassar requires but‑for causation for retaliation claims | Court: Retaliation claim dismissed because Dawson did not allege but‑for causation |
| Whether § 1981 race claim survives despite mixed‑motive pleading | Dawson asserted race discrimination among multiple motives | Wal‑Mart sought dismissal of all claims | Court: § 1981 race claim survives because it does not require but‑for causation; it remains viable |
Key Cases Cited
- Gross v. FBL Financial Servs., 557 U.S. 167 (2009) (ADEA mixed‑motive jury instruction is not permitted; plaintiff must prove but‑for causation)
- Univ. of Tex. Southwestern Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338 (2013) (retaliation claims require but‑for causation)
- Burrage v. United States, 571 U.S. 204 (2014) (but‑for causation principle applied in criminal context; relevant to causation analysis)
- Vega v. Hempstead Union Free Sch. Dist., 801 F.3d 72 (2d Cir. 2015) (applying Gross to require but‑for pleading for ADEA claims)
- Savage v. Secure First Credit Union, 107 F. Supp. 3d 1212 (N.D. Ala. 2015) (earlier opinion by this court addressing same mixed‑motive issues)
- Powell v. Delta Airlines, 145 F. Supp. 3d 189 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (applying Nassar and Vega to require but‑for pleading for retaliation and ADEA claims)