Davita, Inc. v. United States
110 Fed. Cl. 71
Fed. Cl.2013Background
- DaVita provided dialysis services to VA beneficiaries under a 2009 IDIQ contract covering eight VISNs; minimums and pricing were set in contract schedules.
- DaVita also provided non-contracted dialysis services via VA authorizations (under $10,000 per authorization) and VA directives distinguished contracts from authorizations.
- 38 C.F.R. § 17.56 governs payment for non-VA services; the VA historically used a 75th percentile or Medicare-based rate, later shifting Medicare-rate payments in 2009 before attempting to revert.
- DaVita alleged underpayment under both contract-based payments (Count II) and authorization-based payments (Count I), seeking different reliefs (declaratory judgment for Count I, declaratory relief referencing contract rate for Count II).
- The contracting officer denied DaVita’s contract-interpretation claim; the VA argued authorizations are not contracts and § 17.56 is not money-mandating, while DaVita urged jurisdiction under the Tucker Act.
- The court denied the Government’s motion to dismiss, finding that (i) authorizations are not contracts but § 17.56 is money-mandating and provides Tucker Act jurisdiction, and (ii) Count II seeks contract-interpretation relief within CDA jurisdiction.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Count I rests on a money-mandating regulation under Tucker Act | DaVita argues § 17.56 is money-mandating, permitting Tucker Act jurisdiction. | Defendant contends § 17.56 is not money-mandating and authorizations are not contracts subject to CDA. | Yes; § 17.56 is money-mandating and provides Tucker Act jurisdiction. |
| Whether authorizations issued for dialysis are contracts | Authorizations are non-contract instruments; not subject to CDA. | Authorizations are effectively contracts or binding when used against the contract. | Authorizations are not contracts; they are purchase-order-like instruments, not subject to CDA for Count I. |
| Whether Count II appropriately seeks contract-interpretation under the CDA | Count II is a valid CDA claim seeking contract interpretation and declaratory relief. | Count II seeks monetary relief and the contract is an IDIQ, not a requirements contract. | Count II may proceed as a contract-interpretation CDA claim; relief potentially available. |
Key Cases Cited
- Fisher v. United States, 402 F.3d 1167 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (money-mandating source analysis for Tucker Act jurisdiction)
- Alliant Techsystems, Inc. v. United States, 178 F.3d 1260 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (CDAs permit contract-interpretation relief under jurisdiction)
- Gollehon Farming v. United States, 207 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (two-step money-mandating analysis for Tucker Act jurisdiction)
- White Mountain Apache Tribe v. United States, 537 U.S. 465 (Sup. Ct. 2003) (statutory/regulatory money-mandating standard)
- Reflectone, Inc. v. Dalton, 60 F.3d 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (definition of a claim under the CDA; money-mandating considerations)
- Ellett Construction Co. v. United States, 93 F.3d 1537 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (CDA claim elements; written demand for money in sum certain)
- Maropakis Carpentry, Inc. v. United States, 609 F.3d 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (CDA claim requirements; certification and final decision prerequisites)
- Bel Pre Health Care Ctr., Inc. v. United States, 24 Cl. Ct. 495 (Ct. Cl. 1991) (authorization vs. contract distinction for VA payments)
- CW Gov’t Travel, Inc. v. United States, 63 Fed. Cl. 369 (Fed. Cl. 2004) (interpretation vs. monetary relief under CDA; jurisdiction preserved)
- GPA-1, LP v. United States, 46 Fed. Cl. 762 (Fed. Cl. 2000) (declaratory relief tied to contract term interpretation)
- Rodway v. United States Dept. of Agric., 514 F.2d 809 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (vacatur vs. invalid regulation jurisdictional considerations)
- Chamber of Commerce of United States v. S.E.C., 443 F.3d 890 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (APA notice-and-comment considerations and regulatory validity context)