26 F. Supp. 3d 103
D.D.C.2014Background
- Anthony Davis was a GWU service worker/housekeeper (2008–2010) diagnosed with depression, bipolar disorder, and substance abuse and was terminated in December 2010.
- GWU contracted Aramark to provide housekeeping; Aramark supervised daily staffing while GWU handled payroll and benefits.
- Davis’s attendance was governed by GWU Work Rules, the Employee Handbook, and the Collective Bargaining Agreement, with AWOL and documentation requirements tied to illness and leave.
- Davis had prior termination in August 2009, after which a Last Chance Agreement reinstated him with conditions; the agreement allowed immediate discharge for unapproved absences.
- Davis’s leave history includes FMLA leave (June 2009) and multiple absences in 2010 related to illness/medication side effects; the 2010 absences led to his December 2010 AWOL determinations and termination.
- The court granted summary judgment for Defendants on all counts except for a potentially viable hostile work environment claim under the ADA, which was denied without prejudice.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| ADA failure to accommodate standard | Davis sought an accommodation (call-in when ill and make up shifts) as a reasonable modification. | No proper, definite accommodation was requested; proposed open-ended schedule deemed unreasonable. | Summary judgment for GWU; no valid ADA accommodation claim. |
| ADA discriminatory discharge | Discharge was discriminatory based on disability. | Discharge was justified under the Last Chance Agreement for AWOL absences. | No ADA discrimination; discharge supported by LCA. |
| FMLA eligibility and retaliation | Davis was entitled to FMLA leave and retaliated against for taking it. | Davis was not an FMLA-eligible employee (insufficient 1,250 hours) and cannot show pretext; retaliation claim fails. | Davis not FMLA-eligible; no retaliation claim survive. |
| DC FMLA statute of limitations | DCFMLA claims toll during EEOC processing. | DCFMLA has no exhaustion toll; claims time-barred after December 13, 2010 termination. | DCFMLA claims time-barred; dismissed. |
| Tortious interference with contract | Aramark brokered misrepresentations causing GWU to breach the CBA. | LMRA §301 preemption applies; cannot dispute contract terms via state-law tort. | Claim preempted by LMRA §301; dismissal. |
Key Cases Cited
- Brady v. Office of Sergeant at Arms, 520 F.3d 490 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (pretext framework applies in retaliation cases after non-discriminatory reason offered)
- Aka v. Washington Hosp. Center, 156 F.3d 1284 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (three-part McDonnell Douglas framework for ADA discrimination claims when direct evidence is lacking)
- Langon v. HHS, 959 F.2d 1053 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (well-defined reasonable accommodations vary by job; open-ended requests may be unreasonable)
- Carr v. Reno, 23 F.3d 525 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (specific, well-defined accommodations considered reasonable)
- Breen v. Dep’t of Transp., 282 F.3d 839 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (context where accommodation could be accommodated without impinging essential duties)
- Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399 (U.S. 1988) (LMRA preemption and the role of collective bargaining agreements in preemption analyses)
- Sokos v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 283 F. Supp. 2d 42 (D.D.C. 2003) (LMRA preemption when resolving tortious interference hinges on CBA interpretation)
- Jones v. Bernanke, 557 F.3d 670 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (retaliation analysis; temporal proximity not a strict rule)