Davis v. District of Columbia Child and Family Services Agency,et Al
246 F. Supp. 3d 367
| D.D.C. | 2017Background
- CFSA implemented a reduction in force (RIF) effective June 11, 2010, eliminating 115 employees to meet budget cuts; elimination of SSA and SWA positions accounted for the majority of separations.
- CFSA simultaneously created a new Family Support Worker (FSW) role requiring a bachelor’s degree and posted ~35 openings; 44 RIFed employees applied, 30 met the degree requirement, and 18 former employees were rehired as FSWs (all African‑American; 7 were ≥40).
- Plaintiffs (originally 47 named) allege the RIF and the FSW bachelor’s‑degree requirement had disparate impact and, as to the degree requirement, disparate treatment based on race and age (Title VII and DCHRA claims).
- Competing statistical experts: Plaintiffs’ expert (Dr. Munro) analyzed agency‑wide termination rates and found significant adverse impact by race and age; defendant’s expert (Dr. Bronars) analyzed by subdivisions/positions and found no statistically significant disparity.
- Procedural/posture: After discovery, the District moved for summary judgment; Plaintiffs renewed class certification. Court granted summary judgment for the District on all remaining claims and denied class certification as moot.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether several plaintiffs are judicially estopped for failing to list claims in bankruptcy | Ajakaiye and Alston lack evidence of intent to conceal; omissions inadvertent | Bankruptcy nondisclosure bars pursuit of claims (judicial estoppel) | Court: Judicial estoppel applies; claims barred for those two plaintiffs |
| Standing to challenge FSW degree requirement for plaintiffs who already had bachelor’s degrees | Job loss from RIF gives standing to challenge all related policies | Plaintiffs with degrees suffered no injury from degree requirement | Court: Plaintiffs with bachelor’s degrees lack standing to challenge the FSW degree rule |
| Whether non‑filing plaintiffs may rely on EEOC charges filed by two named plaintiffs (vicarious exhaustion) | Vicarious exhaustion appropriate because charges put employer on notice of RIF and FSW degree concerns | Only Morris and Ajakaiye exhausted; others lack administrative exhaustion | Court: Vicarious exhaustion available here; other plaintiffs may rely on the EEOC filings |
| Whether the RIF or FSW degree requirement supports disparate impact / disparate treatment claims | RIF is a facially neutral practice; Munro’s agency‑wide stats show disparate impact; FSW degree functionally duplicates SSA duties and was foreseeable | RIF comprised multiple individualized, position‑targeted decisions; plaintiffs failed to identify a specific neutral practice; FSW hiring statistics show no adverse effect | Court: Plaintiffs failed to identify a specific employment practice for the RIF (disparate impact claim dismissed); FSW degree produced no statistically significant adverse impact and no pattern‑or‑practice disparate treatment proved — summary judgment for defendant |
Key Cases Cited
- Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242 (summary judgment standard)
- Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (summary judgment burdens)
- Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (disparate impact doctrine)
- Smith v. City of Jackson cited via City of Jackson, 544 U.S. 228 (plaintiff must identify specific practice causing disparity)
- Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557 (disparate impact prima facie and causation)
- Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (discussing burdens in disparate impact cases)
- Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (pattern or practice and proof distinctions)
- New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742 (judicial estoppel principles)
- Moses v. Howard Univ. Hosp., 606 F.3d 789 (application of judicial estoppel in bankruptcy context)
- Aliotta v. Bair, 614 F.3d 556 (D.C. Cir. analysis of RIF/statistical proof)