112 A.3d 1034
Md. Ct. Spec. App.2015Background
- 13-year-old Ashley Davis lived at Brinkley Manor on Brinkley Road and was assigned a school bus stop on the north side (Bus #674); a stop for the same school on the south side (Bus #661) served nearby students.
- From the first day of school Bus #674 repeatedly failed to stop on the north side (turning around before the Brinkley Manor stop); evidence indicated the driver effectively never served Ashley’s assigned stop.
- On September 1, 2009 Ashley crossed the four-lane Brinkley Road to catch Bus #661 and was struck by a car; she died two weeks later. She had looked both ways before crossing.
- Plaintiffs (parents/personal representative) sued the Prince George’s County Board of Education for negligence; a jury found the Board negligent and awarded over $90 million in damages.
- Trial court granted the Board’s JNOV, finding no legal duty and, alternatively, contributory negligence as a matter of law; it also made alternative rulings on damages (reducing to $100,000 under statutory immunity or, alternatively, remitting to $166,000, and deducting $20,000 settled with the driver).
- Court of Special Appeals: reversed JNOV as to liability (duty exists under COMAR), held contributory negligence was a jury question, and remanded for a damages hearing to determine applicability/limits of statutory immunity and correct reductions.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Duty to provide safe bus stops on four-lane road | COMAR 13A.06.07.13C and Board policy create a statutory duty to provide stops on students’ side of four-lane highways so they need not cross | No cognizable statutory/common-law duty; adopt a custody-notice rule (no duty because student not in Board custody and Board lacked notice of pickup problem) | Held: COMAR 13A.06.07.13C creates a statutory duty to locate stops so students need not cross four-lane highways; trial court erred in finding no duty |
| Decedent's contributory negligence (Ashley) | Ashley was not contributorily negligent as a matter of law; she looked both ways, was attentive, and could have been struck by a car that left its lane | Ashley moved into the path of a vehicle and crossed outside a crosswalk; contributory negligence/assumption of risk should bar recovery | Held: Rejected defendant’s JNOV on contributory negligence. Issue is factual and for a jury; crossing outside a crosswalk is not negligence per se |
| Parent’s contributory negligence (Nycole) | Nycole did not waive or forfeit claims; court improperly found her negligent as matter of law for not contacting schools and allowing Ashley to cross | (Board did not argue Nycole was negligent in its JNOV motion) | Held: Court erred to decide Nycole was contributorily negligent as a matter of law; issue was not properly before court and was not supported as a legal bar |
| Damages reductions: sovereign immunity, remittitur, and settlement credit | Plaintiffs: Board bears burden to prove entitlement to immunity/insurance limits; remittitur requires a motion for new trial; settlement with driver who denied liability cannot reduce Board’s liability absent driver’s proven fault | Board: Entitled to reduce award under EA §4-105 and CJ §5-518 (cap $100,000 if self-insured or pool; otherwise to policy limit); verdict excessive and should be remitted; credit $20,000 settlement with driver | Held: Remanded to determine Board’s insurance/self-insurance status (Board must prove coverage/limits); trial court erred in granting remittitur on JNOV (remittitur requires new-trial procedure); court erred reducing verdict by $20,000 because driver denied liability and was not adjudicated a joint tortfeasor |
Key Cases Cited
- Houston v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 346 Md. 503 (trial-court JNOV standard and view of evidence) (cited for standard of review)
- Hemmings v. Pelham Wood Ltd. Liability Ltd. Partnership, 375 Md. 522 (elements of negligence and duty are legal question)
- Valentine v. On Target, Inc., 353 Md. 544 (negligence issues as jury questions except duty)
- Pendleton v. State, 398 Md. 447 (existence of legal duty is for the court)
- Blackburn Ltd. P’ship v. Paul, 438 Md. 100 (Statute/Ordinance Rule; COMAR can create statutory duty)
- Wietzke v. Chesapeake Conference Ass’n, 421 Md. 355 (statutory/regulatory duty requires protection of particular class)
- Remsburg v. Montgomery, 376 Md. 568 (statute/ordinance rule principles)
- Allen v. Dackman, 413 Md. 132 (COMAR/statutory duties can displace common-law limitations)
- Beka Indus., Inc. v. Worcester Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 419 Md. 194 (county boards are state agencies; CJ §5-518 sovereign-immunity waiver explained)
- Bd. of Educ. of Baltimore Cnty. v. Zimmer-Rubert, 409 Md. 200 (sovereign immunity background and CJ §5-518 discussion)
- Mona v. Mona Elec. Group, Inc., 176 Md. App. 672 (JNOV purpose — set aside verdict, not remit damages)
- Pratt v. Coleman, 14 Md. App. 76 (pedestrian crossing between crosswalks not negligent per se)
- Lewis v. Hammond, 247 Md. 297 (crossing outside crosswalk is a circumstance, not presumptive negligence)
- Swigert v. Welk, 213 Md. 613 (release by injured party from nonliability-taking tortfeasor does not reduce others’ liability)
- Loh v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 47 Md. App. 110 (release by one claiming no liability does not affect others’ liability)