Davis v. Benson
1:20-cv-00768
W.D. Mich.Mar 11, 2022Background:
- Plaintiff Robert Davis filed a recall petition for Detroit's mayor in April 2019; Mario Morrow then filed a complaint with Michigan Secretary of State Jocelyn Benson alleging Davis violated the Campaign Finance Act by not forming a committee.
- Davis alleged a conspiracy involving Morrow, Secretary Benson, Benson’s husband, and Mayor Duggan to retaliate against him and to initiate a frivolous campaign-finance investigation; Davis sought Benson’s recusal from that investigation.
- Davis is a Michigan state employee and had previously sued the Secretary of State in state court over other election-related matters; he alleges Benson tried to pressure his employer to terminate him.
- Davis’s Second Amended Complaint asserted six counts: (I) Equal Protection (class-of-one) for refusal to recuse; (II) First Amendment retaliation (efforts to remove him from state employment); (III) § 1983 conspiracy; (IV) as-applied First Amendment challenge to definitions of “contribution” and “expenditure”; (V) void-for-vagueness challenge; and (VI) Michigan-law defamation by Morrow.
- Defendants moved to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The district court applied the Iqbal/Twombly pleading standard and dismissed all six counts for failure to state a plausible claim; a judgment followed.
Issues:
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Count I: Equal protection (class-of-one) for Benson's refusal to recuse | Davis: Benson treated him differently by refusing recusal despite recusing in other family-related matters | Benson: Davis failed to plead any similarly situated comparators or disparate treatment | Dismissed — no plausible allegations identifying similarly situated comparators; conclusory allegations insufficient |
| Count II: First Amendment retaliation (pressure to fire) | Davis: Benson pressured his employer and threatened his job after he sued and spoke publicly; that is an adverse action | Benson: Davis continued to sue and speak, and he failed to plead threats or timing establishing an adverse action or causal link | Dismissed — plaintiff did not sufficiently allege an adverse action or causal connection |
| Count III: § 1983 conspiracy (Morrow and others) | Davis: Morrow, Benson, and others agreed to file the complaint and seek criminal referral to retaliate | Morrow: Conspiracy claims must be pleaded with specificity and require an underlying actionable tort | Dismissed — conspiracy allegations were conclusory and produced no actionable tort |
| Count IV: As-applied First Amendment challenge to definitions in Mich. Comp. Laws §§169.204(1), 169.206(1) | Davis: Definitions were applied to initiate an unconstitutional investigation based on his political speech to press | Benson: No enforcement or enforcement threat was alleged; mere press statements do not fall within statutory definitions | Dismissed — plaintiff failed to allege present or imminent enforcement or how definitions were used against him |
| Count V: Void-for-vagueness challenge to the same definitions | Davis: Statutory definitions are vague, leading to arbitrary enforcement against him | Benson: The cited sections are definitional, not prohibitory, and plaintiff fails to show how they proscribe his press statements | Dismissed — no plausible showing that definitions are vague as applied or that enforcement was imminent |
| Count VI: State-law defamation by Morrow | Davis: Morrow publicly accused him of crimes (news article, bar comments, statements to prosecutor’s office) | Morrow: Prior alleged statements are time-barred; remaining allegations lack particularity and are privileged in context of reporting to enforcement officers | Dismissed — earlier allegations barred by statute of limitations; remaining claim not pleaded with required particularity and is privileged |
Key Cases Cited
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (federal pleading standard requires plausibly pleaded factual allegations)
- Vill. of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562 (2000) (class-of-one equal protection framework)
- United States v. Green, 654 F.3d 637 (6th Cir. 2011) (application of class-of-one standard)
- 16630 Southfield Ltd. P'ship v. Flagstar Bank, F.S.B., 727 F.3d 502 (6th Cir. 2013) (plausibility and factual content under Rule 12(b)(6))
- Eidson v. State of Tennessee Dep't of Children's Servs., 510 F.3d 631 (6th Cir. 2007) (conclusory allegations are insufficient)
- Dixon v. Univ. of Toledo, 702 F.3d 269 (6th Cir. 2012) (elements of a First Amendment retaliation claim)
- Anders v. Cuevas, 984 F.3d 1166 (6th Cir. 2021) (First Amendment retaliation standards)
- Ctr. for Bio-Ethical Reform, Inc. v. Napolitano, 648 F.3d 365 (6th Cir. 2011) (dismissing conclusory equal protection allegations)
- Memphis, Tennessee Area Local, Am. Postal Workers Union v. City of Memphis, 361 F.3d 898 (6th Cir. 2004) (elements of civil conspiracy claim)
- Green Party of Tennessee v. Hargett, 700 F.3d 816 (6th Cir. 2012) (interpretation of campaign finance provisions)
- Mitan v. Campbell, 706 N.W.2d 420 (Mich. 2005) (Michigan one-year statute of limitations for defamation)
- Grist v. Upjohn Co., 134 N.W.2d 358 (Mich. 1965) (each defamatory utterance is a separate cause of action)