David Zink v. George Lombardi, 2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 3550

Prisoners sentenced to death in Missouri challenge the state's lethal-injection protocol in a federal suit against state officials and two contractors who allegedly supply/prepare the compounded pentobarbital.
Missouri moved from a three-drug protocol to propofol in 2012, then to compounded pentobarbital by late 2013–2014; the litigation timeline spans 2012–2014 with multiple amendments.
The district court dismissed most claims but allowed an Eighth Amendment claim alleging cruel and unusual punishment and later permitted amendment to plead whether an alternative method existed that would reduce pain.
A discovery dispute led to orders seeking identities of the pentobarbital prescriber, the compounding pharmacist, and the testing lab; on en banc review, the court noted the complaint’s relevance to those identities.
The appellate court affirmed dismissal of the Eighth Amendment claim, holding the second amended complaint failed to plead a substantial risk of severe pain with a readily available, feasible alternative method; other claims were expressly dismissed.
Dissenting opinions contend the pleading standard was too high and discovery should be allowed to determine the actual risks and feasible alternatives.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Does the second amended complaint plausibly allege a substantial risk of pain?	Prisoners claim compounded pentobarbital creates a substantial risk of severe pain.	Defendants argue the allegations are speculative and fail to show a sure or very likely risk of harm.	No; claim inadequately pled.
Must plaintiffs plead a feasible, readily implemented alternative method to survive?	Hill/Baze framework allows §1983 challenge without detailing an alternative; discovery may reveal an alternative.	Lombardi requires a plausible, feasible alternative that would significantly reduce risk.	Yes; naked/unsupported assertion of alternatives is insufficient.
Does the suit properly state a Due Process claim regarding access to information about the drug?	Prisoners claim a due process right to obtain information about drug sources.	No cognizable due process violation; no protected liberty interest in disclosure.	No; failed to state a due process claim.
Do the First Amendment and public-access principles require disclosure of drug sources?	Right to know the source of drugs; confidentiality violates First Amendment/public access.	No established First Amendment right to such disclosure; no tradition of accessibility.	No; failure to state a First Amendment public-access claim.

In re Lombardi, 741 F.3d 888 (8th Cir. 2014) (pleading requirements for alternative execution methods; discovery considerations)
Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S. 35 (U.S. 2008) (Eighth Amendment standard; feasible alternative must significantly reduce risk)
Hill v. McDonough, 547 U.S. 573 (U.S. 2006) (§1983 vs habeas; pleading requirements not to identify alternatives in general)
Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (U.S. 2007) (praised pleading standards under Rule 8; heightened pleading rejected)
Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (U.S. 2009) (pleading plausibility standard; not merely conclusory statements)
Wellons v. Commissioner, Ga. Dept. of Corrections, 754 F.3d 1260 (11th Cir. 2014) (no right to disclosure of drug sources; public-access doctrine not implicated)