David Young v. Trails End Homeowners Association, Inc. TLS Properties, Ltd. TLS Operating Company, LLC Van Keene And Rick Durapau
03-14-00535-CV
| Tex. App. | May 22, 2015Background
- Plaintiff David Young bought Lot 52 in the Trails End subdivision (1997) and claims an unplatted “Extended Property” that runs “to the center of Big Sandy Creek,” which he asserts crosses to the peninsula containing Lots 139/140 and an adjoining 1.4777‑acre tract.
- The 1947 Plat showed Lot 52 and creek arms; a 1962 replat created Lots 139 and 140; TLS Properties acquired Lots 139/140 (1998) and later conveyed Lot 139 and the 1.4777‑acre tract to Trails End Homeowners Association (TEHOA) (2008).
- TEHOA used and/or leased the parcels for boat access and park/ recreation purposes for many years; plaintiffs blocked access to a roadway (West Darleen Drive) that provides ingress/egress.
- At a two‑day bench trial, Defendants presented uncontradicted survey and expert testimony (Crichton) showing no conflict between Lot 52 (or any valid extended strip) and Lots 139/140 or the 1.4777‑acre tract.
- Trial court granted directed verdict on tort claims, found plaintiff failed to prove title to the Extended Property, concluded Defendants had title/adverse possession/rights to use the parcels and to West Darleen Drive, enjoined further trespass, and awarded attorneys’ fees.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Young) | Defendant's Argument (TEHOA/TLS) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. May Young raise on appeal that the 1962 replat was illegal though not raised at trial? | The 1962 replat was “botched” and should be set aside; he contends lack of owner consent. | Issue was waived because it was not preserved at trial; statute cited (Art. 974a) doesn’t apply (not in city limits) and the 1962 plat did not affect Lot 52. | Waived and inapplicable; appeal cannot rely on new issues/evidence not presented at trial. |
| 2. Did Young prove superior title to the alleged Extended Property (written description to center of Big Sandy Creek)? | The Trundle deed language extends Young’s property to the center line of Big Sandy Creek, supporting ownership of the Extended Property. | Expert testimony and plats show the extension, if any, refers to the creek arm (the gully) between Lot 52 and Lot 140 and does not cross to the peninsula; Trundle deed recorded after 1962 replat and is not controlling over recorded replat/deeds. | Court found the deed language reasonably read as to the creek arm (no conflict) and plaintiff failed to present admissible evidence of an extension that conflicts with Defendants’ parcels. |
| 3. Are Young’s title claims time‑barred / have Defendants acquired title by adverse possession or constructive notice? | Young disputes adverse possession and contends lack of notice. | Defendants argue the 1962 plat and the 1998 recorded deeds provided constructive notice; TLS/TEHOA and predecessors possessed, used, paid taxes, and leased the parcels for decades (satisfying statutes). | Claims were untimely: limitations and adverse‑possession principles bar Young’s title claims; constructive notice from recorded instruments (1962 plat, 1998 deeds) defeats his attack. |
| 4. Was injunction and award of damages/fees against Young proper for trespass and obstruction of West Darleen Drive? | Young disputes extent of roadway and that he trespassed; he challenges factual findings. | Evidence (surveys, photos, testimony) shows Young erected a long‑standing blockade partly on the roadway/adjoining parcels, denying TEHOA and members access; West Darleen Drive is depicted on the plat and is a public/prescriptive right‑of‑way. | Trial court properly found trespass and granted permanent injunction; findings supported by uncontradicted evidence. |
Key Cases Cited
- City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802 (Tex. 2005) (standard for reviewing factual sufficiency and deference to fact‑finder on credibility)
- Ford Motor Co. v. Ridgway, 135 S.W.3d 598 (Tex. 2004) (definition of more‑than‑a‑scintilla legal sufficiency)
- Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175 (Tex. 1986) (factual‑sufficiency standard for appellate review)
- Service Corp. v. Guerra, 348 S.W.3d 221 (Tex. 2011) (no‑evidence review principles)
- HECI Exploration Co. v. Neel, 982 S.W.2d 881 (Tex. 1998) (constructive notice from public records and title stability)
- Wilson v. Fisher, 188 S.W.2d 150 (Tex. 1945) (writing must describe land with reasonable certainty)
- Davis v. Howe, 213 S.W. 609 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1919) (recorded instruments give force of notice to adverse claim)