David Wayne Allen v. Betty Mitchell, 953 F.3d 858

David Wayne Allen was convicted in Ohio (1991) of aggravated robbery and aggravated murder and sentenced to death; physical and forensic evidence (thumbprint on victim's glasses, cigarette butts with matching brand and saliva) linked him to the killing.
Juror Patricia Worthington disclosed during voir dire that her brother had been murdered and that she had attended his trial (resulting in an acquittal); she knew the detective and prosecutor from that case and said she felt bitterness but repeatedly stated she could set those feelings aside.
Allen exhausted his peremptory strikes and challenged Worthington for cause; the trial court denied the challenge after hearing her assurances and observing her demeanor; Worthington was empaneled as the twelfth juror.
The Ohio Supreme Court (4–3) affirmed the trial court's decision to seat Worthington; three justices dissented that she should have been excused for cause.
Allen filed federal habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 alleging juror bias and inadequate voir dire; the district court denied relief, applying AEDPA deference to the state court factual and legal determinations, and this court affirmed.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether seating Worthington deprived Allen of his Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury	Worthington's personal connection (brother's murder), attendance at that trial, emotional responses, and equivocal answers showed actual or implied bias that should have led to excusal for cause	Trial court observed Worthington, credited her repeated assurances she could be fair and impartial, and questioning showed no overt bias; juror-credibility determinations warrant deference	Court held state court's finding of impartiality was reasonable under Patton/Witt and AEDPA; no habeas relief granted
Whether voir dire was constitutionally inadequate for failing to ask compelled questions about her ability to follow instructions, evaluate evidence, and impose death	Trial court failed to ask constitutionally compelled, specific questions probing whether Worthington would automatically favor death or be unable to follow instructions given her history	The court had asked whether she could set aside feelings, follow instructions, and recommend sentence options; no clear indication she would automatically impose death or be unable to follow the law	Claim was not raised in state court (procedurally defaulted) and, on the merits, voir dire was adequate; no relief warranted

Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025 (1984) (two-part test for juror impartiality and whether juror's protestation should be believed)
Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412 (1985) (deference to trial judge on juror bias based on demeanor)
Mu’Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415 (1991) (voir dire must include constitutionally compelled questions when necessary to avoid fundamental unfairness)
Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719 (1992) (voir dire required to expose jurors who would automatically impose death)
White v. Mitchell, 431 F.3d 517 (6th Cir. 2005) (habeas relief where juror’s assurances were contradicted by the totality of voir dire)
Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652 (2004) (clarifies “clearly established Federal law” for AEDPA review)
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000) (defines unreasonable application standard under AEDPA)
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (2011) (emphasizes AEDPA deference to state-court decisions)
Brumfield v. Cain, 135 S. Ct. 2269 (2015) (state-court factual findings must be objectively unreasonable to be overturned on habeas)