DAVID TIMOTHY CURRY v. STATE OF FLORIDA
227 So. 3d 628
| Fla. Dist. Ct. App. | 2017Background
- In 2004, appellant David Curry was alleged to have sexually assaulted T.M. (born Jan. 1992) and S.M. (born June 1994) during a visit to his apartment; T.M. was 12 and S.M. was 10 at the time.
- Charged counts: Count I (sexual battery of T.M. by person in familial/custodial authority), Count II (lewd/lascivious molestation of T.M., age 12–16), Count III (lewd/lascivious molestation of S.M., under 12).
- Jury convicted on all three counts; trial court sentenced Curry to consecutive terms (30, 15, and 15 years) and designated him a sexual predator.
- Count II was originally alleged to have occurred between March 24 and Dec. 31, 2004; the information was filed Apr. 8, 2010.
- T.M. reported the abuse to the Department of Children and Families (DCF) on or about Aug. 7, 2006; the State began prosecution in 2010.
- Trial court denied Curry’s motion to dismiss Count II as time-barred; the Fourth District affirmed Counts I and III, but reversed Count II based on statute-of-limitations tolling rules.
Issues
| Issue | Appellant's Argument | State's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether statute of limitations for Count II began when report made to DCF in Aug. 2006 | Report to DCF (a governmental agency) triggered §775.15(7)(a), so three-year limitations expired before prosecution | Limitations did not run until the allegation was reported to State Attorney (or until law enforcement report in 2008) | Limitations began when reported to DCF in 2006; Count II time-barred and dismissal required |
| Whether §775.15(7)(a)’s requirement that agency “promptly report such allegation to the state attorney” delays commencement of limitations | The reporting duty does not modify when limitations commences; commencement is upon report to any governmental agency | The requirement means limitations shouldn’t run until agency reports to State Attorney | Court held the plain text starts the clock upon reporting to a law enforcement or other governmental agency; the prompt-report duty does not delay commencement |
| Whether the State may, on appeal, argue the 2006 DCF report did not include the specific conduct alleged in Count II | N/A (appellant relied on State’s concession below) | State argued for first time on appeal that DCF report omitted the specific act (massaging penis) so 2006 report did not trigger limitations | Court declined the belated argument; bound State to its concession and noted trial court could have held evidentiary hearing if issue raised below |
| Whether Dankert requires a different result | N/A | Reliance on Dankert to require agency-to-State-Attorney reporting before limitations runs | Court found Dankert distinguishable and not controlling on the precise issue; its language suggesting agency must report to state attorney before clock starts was dicta |
Key Cases Cited
- Bryson v. State, 42 So. 3d 852 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (standard of review for statutory interpretation is de novo)
- State v. Hackley, 95 So. 3d 92 (Fla. 2012) (courts first look to statute’s plain language)
- Hechtman v. Nations Title Ins. of N.Y., 840 So. 2d 993 (Fla. 2003) (give effect to every word of a statute)
- Daniels v. Fla. Dep’t of Health, 898 So. 2d 61 (Fla. 2005) (do not look beyond plain language unless ambiguous)
- State v. Chubbuck, 141 So. 3d 1163 (Fla. 2014) (statutory text controls absent unreasonable result)
- Brown v. State, 179 So. 3d 466 (Fla. 4th DCA 2015) (reporting to law enforcement or other governmental agency triggers limitations under earlier §775.15(7))
- Dankert v. State, 859 So. 2d 1221 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) (agency report to state attorney discussed but not controlling on whether agency’s failure to report delays commencement)
- U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Vogel, 137 So. 3d 491 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014) (party is bound by factual concessions made by counsel)
- Holub v. Holub, 54 So. 3d 585 (Fla. 1st DCA 2011) (same regarding counsel’s factual concessions)