DAVID SCHWARTZ VS. BOROUGH OF HIGHLAND PARK,ET AL.(L-4967-14, MIDDLESEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE), A-2988-14T1

Background

Four Highland Park homeowners received municipal summonses for failing to repair sidewalks under Ordinance 941 § 368-15, which placed responsibility for sidewalk maintenance on property owners.
Plaintiffs challenged the ordinance as vague and violative of due process, alleging tree roots and municipal actions caused the defects and that homeowners did not own the sidewalks. They sought declaratory relief and a preliminary injunction under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law.
The Law Division granted a preliminary injunction enjoining enforcement of the summonses, finding the ordinance’s enforcement standard arbitrary and vague. The Borough vacated pending enforcement actions and later repealed and replaced the ordinance.
Plaintiffs moved for attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b), invoking the ‘‘catalyst’’ theory; the trial court initially denied the motion as premature but later found plaintiffs were a prevailing party under the catalyst doctrine and awarded limited fees and costs.
On appeal, the Borough argued plaintiffs were not prevailing parties because there was no final merits determination; plaintiffs argued the repeal and amendment of the ordinance rendered them prevailing parties and entitled to fees.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether plaintiffs are a "prevailing party" under § 1988 via the catalyst theory	Plaintiffs argued their lawsuit caused the Borough to repeal/amend the ordinance and thus they achieved relief that modified defendants' behavior	Borough argued there was no final merits determination or enforceable judgment, so plaintiffs cannot be prevailing parties	Court: Plaintiffs are prevailing parties under the catalyst theory because their litigation had a causal nexus to the ordinance change and the relief had a legal basis (preliminary injunction findings)
Whether preliminary injunctive relief alone can support fee awards	Plaintiffs: Preliminary injunction that prevented enforcement and prompted ordinance change is sufficient under precedent	Borough: Preliminary relief alone does not automatically make a litigant a prevailing party (Sole v. Wyner)	Court: Preliminary relief can support fees under catalyst framework if causal nexus and legal basis exist; here both prongs met
Proper standard for awarding attorney’s fees and scope of award	Plaintiffs sought full fees for work performed	Borough did not contest hourly rate but asserted limits on recoverable time	Court: Applied Rendine lodestar approach, accepted $425/hr, excluded unreasonable/excessive hours, and awarded $11,362.50 plus costs; no abuse of discretion found
Whether trial court erred in finding causation between suit and ordinance repeal	Plaintiffs: Their suit and advocacy directly led to repeal/amendment	Borough: Repeal was independent and not causally linked to plaintiffs’ suit	Court: Trial court’s factual finding of causation stands; appellate court affirms under catalyst standard

Key Cases Cited

Mason v. City of Hoboken, 196 N.J. 51 (N.J. 2008) (recognizes catalyst theory for prevailing-party status under fee statutes)
D. Russo, Inc. v. Twp. of Union, 417 N.J. Super. 384 (App. Div. 2010) (preliminary relief and catalyst theory can support fee awards absent final adjudication)
Crowe v. De Gioia, 90 N.J. 126 (N.J. 1982) (factors for preliminary injunction including probability of success)
Rendine v. Pantzer, 141 N.J. 292 (N.J. 1995) (lodestar method and reduction/exclusion of unreasonable hours for fee awards)
Sole v. Wyner, 551 U.S. 74 (U.S. 2007) (preliminary injunctive relief alone does not automatically confer prevailing-party status)
Stockton v. Rhulen, 302 N.J. Super. 236 (App. Div. 1997) (prevailing-party analysis for civil-rights fee claims)
Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103 (U.S. 1992) (definition of prevailing party and requirement of relief on significant claim)
Tex. State Teachers Ass'n v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782 (U.S. 1989) (prevailing-party status not dependent solely on timing of fee request)