David R. Smith v. The Tennessee National Guard
M2016-01109-COA-R3-CV
| Tenn. Ct. App. | Mar 31, 2017Background
- Plaintiff David R. Smith separated from the Tennessee National Guard in July 2011 after finishing active-duty tour and was denied reemployment in a full‑time Guard position.
- Smith initially sued in 2011 under the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA); that suit was dismissed for sovereign immunity, and the dismissal was affirmed.
- The Tennessee Legislature enacted Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-208 (Public Chapter 574), effective July 1, 2014, waiving sovereign immunity for governmental-entity claims under USERRA and stating it applies to claims "accruing on or after" that date.
- Smith filed a new USERRA suit in January 2016 based on his July 2011 separation.
- The dissenting judge (W. Neal McBrayer, J.) addresses whether the statute waived sovereign immunity for claims arising from events that occurred before July 1, 2014.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Tenn. Code Ann. § 29-20-208 waives sovereign immunity for Smith's 2011 USERRA claim | Smith: claim never "accrued" until waiver existed (i.e., July 1, 2014), so waiver covers his claim | State: waiver applies only to claims "accruing on or after" July 1, 2014 — i.e., claims arising after that date | Dissent: waiver does not apply to events occurring before July 1, 2014; Smith's claim remains barred by sovereign immunity |
| Proper meaning of "accruing" in the statute | Smith: "accrue" means come into existence as an enforceable claim (ripeness depends on right to sue) | State: "accruing" should be read in context with "on or after" to mean claims arising on/after the effective date | Dissent: "accruing" should be read as "arising" in context; "on or after" limits waiver to claims based on events occurring on/after July 1, 2014 |
| Canon for construing sovereign‑immunity waivers | Smith: (implicit) statutory language sufficiently clear to waive immunity for his claim | State: waiver must be "plain, clear, and unmistakable"; ambiguous timing should be construed against retroactive waiver | Dissent: because waiver of sovereign immunity must be clear, ambiguous wording should not be read to reach past events |
| Role of statutory context vs. isolated dictionary definition | Smith: relies on common legal definition that claim "accrues" when enforceable (post‑waiver) | State: emphasizes the statute's phrase "on or after" and ordinary meaning "arising" | Dissent: context controls; "accruing on or after" shows legislative intent to limit waiver to future claims/events |
Key Cases Cited
- Smith v. Tenn. Nat’l Guard, 387 S.W.3d 570 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2012) (prior appeal dismissing Smith’s original USERRA suit on sovereign immunity grounds)
- Wyatt v. A-Best Co., 910 S.W.2d 851 (Tenn. 1995) (tort cause of action accrues when a judicial remedy is available)
- Eastman Chem. Co. v. Johnson, 151 S.W.3d 503 (Tenn. 2004) (statutory words must not be interpreted to render any provision meaningless)
- Scates v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Union City, 265 S.W.2d 563 (Tenn. 1954) (waiver of sovereign immunity must be clear and unmistakable)
- Northland Ins. Co. v. State, 33 S.W.3d 727 (Tenn. 2000) (statutes authorizing suit against the state must provide consent in plain, clear, unmistakable terms)
- In re Estate of Tanner, 295 S.W.3d 610 (Tenn. 2009) (context matters in statutory construction)
- Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (U.S. 1803) (foundational principle that applying text to circumstances requires interpretation)