David Peterson v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc.
2015 U.S. App. LEXIS 19937
5th Cir.2015Background
- Peterson, a regional sales manager, was laid off in Bell Helicopter’s 2008 reduction-in-force (RIF) after the company lost a major Army contract. Bell used objective selection criteria (performance scores, impact rankings, negative documentation) to select ~500 employees for layoff.
- Peterson sued under the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act (TCHRA) and federal law for age discrimination and pursued contract claims; federal ADEA claims and contract claims were dismissed and not appealed; the TCHRA claim survived summary judgment.
- At trial the jury found age was a motivating factor in Peterson’s termination but also found Bell would have terminated him regardless, so the jury awarded no damages.
- After judgment, Peterson moved (for the first time) for injunctive and declaratory relief and attorneys’ fees; the district court enjoined Bell from age discrimination generally (particularly in future RIFs) and awarded Peterson attorneys’ fees of $339,987.50.
- The Fifth Circuit reversed, holding Peterson waived injunctive relief by waiting until after judgment (prejudicing Bell) and concluding Peterson was not entitled to attorneys’ fees because he obtained no meaningful relief under Texas law.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Waiver of injunctive relief / Rule 54(c) | Peterson argued Rule 54(c) permits relief not specifically requested if pleadings contain a general prayer and relief is legally permissible. | Bell argued Peterson never sought injunctive relief until after judgment, prejudicing Bell by denying opportunity to defend against broad injunctive relief. | Held: Peterson waived injunctive relief; post-judgment request prejudiced Bell and Rule 54(c) does not save untimely, prejudicial requests. |
| Propriety and scope of injunction | Peterson sought an injunction banning age discrimination generally (especially in RIFs). | Bell contended the injunction was overbroad, vague, and imposed sweeping, indefinite obligations without prior notice. | Held: Court vacated the injunction as improperly granted after waiver (also noting overbreadth/vagueness concerns). |
| Attorneys’ fees under TCHRA §21.125(b) | Peterson argued §21.125(b) authorizes fees when plaintiff proves motivating-factor liability even if employer would have acted anyway. | Bell argued Texas law (and Chapter 21 read as a whole) requires the plaintiff to obtain meaningful relief (prevailing-party-type showing) to recover fees. | Held: Peterson not entitled to fees; because injunction was vacated, he obtained no meaningful relief and Texas authorities require recovery of some actual relief to award fees. |
| (Not reached on merits) Sufficiency of discrimination evidence | Peterson relied on testimony suggesting decisionmakers referenced lists and comments denying performance reasons; he argued pretext and motivating-factor proof. | Bell maintained objective RIF criteria and performance scores supported nondiscriminatory reason and that evidence of age discrimination was insufficient. | Held: Fifth Circuit did not need to decide sufficiency because it reversed on waiver and fees grounds. |
Key Cases Cited
- James v. Stockham Valves & Fittings Co., 559 F.2d 310 (5th Cir.) (discussing mandatory injunctive relief standards in Title VII context)
- EEOC v. Rogers Bros., 470 F.2d 965 (5th Cir.) (injunctive relief precedent cited)
- Peaches Entm’t Corp. v. Entm’t Repertoire Assocs., Inc., 62 F.3d 690 (5th Cir. 1995) (standard of review for injunctions: abuse of discretion)
- Sapp v. Renfroe, 511 F.2d 172 (5th Cir. 1975) (Rule 54(c) relief limited where opposing party is prejudiced)
- Engel v. Teleprompter Corp., 732 F.2d 1238 (5th Cir. 1984) (Rule 54(c) denial appropriate where failure to seek relief prejudices opponent)
- Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598 (2001) (clarified prevailing-party concept for fee awards)
- Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103 (1992) (plaintiff must obtain enforceable judgment or other meaningful relief to be a prevailing party)
- Garcia v. City of Houston, 201 F.3d 672 (5th Cir.) (construing mixed-motive fee provision under Title VII)
- Sw. Bell Mobile Sys., Inc. v. Franco, 971 S.W.2d 52 (Tex.) (Texas Supreme Court: prevailing-party requires recovery of actual relief)
- Burgmann Seals Am., Inc. v. Cadenhead, 135 S.W.3d 854 (Tex. App.) (interpreting §21.125 to deny fees where plaintiff obtained no actual damages or equitable relief)