147 So. 3d 641
Fla. Dist. Ct. App.2014Background
- Judge Donald R. Moran, Jr. sent a resignation letter to Governor Scott on March 26, 2014, later clarifying the resignation would be effective January 2, 2015 (three calendar days before the term ended).
- Governor Scott accepted the resignation on April 10, 2014, before the statutory qualifying period for the 2014 judicial election (which began April 28, 2014).
- David Trotti filed preliminary candidate paperwork (Form DS-DE 9) in early April and sought to qualify for Group 12 of the Fourth Judicial Circuit during the upcoming qualifying period.
- The Division of Elections informed Trotti that because Moran’s resignation had been accepted before qualifying began, the vacancy would be filled by gubernatorial appointment, not by election.
- Trotti petitioned for a writ of mandamus to compel the Secretary of State to accept his qualifying papers; the trial court denied relief and the appellate court affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the seat must be filled by election or by gubernatorial appointment | Trotti: Spector favors election where resignation is effective at term end or causes only a brief vacancy; a one-business-day vacancy is not "unreasonable," so election should prevail | Secretary/Governor: Vacancy occurred when the Governor accepted the resignation before qualifying began; under precedent, vacancies that occur before qualifying must be filled by appointment | Vacancy occurred when resignation was accepted before qualifying; because that acceptance preceded the qualifying period, appointment is required |
| Whether mandamus can compel the Secretary to accept qualifying papers | Trotti: He had filed candidate paperwork and thus had the right to qualify | Secretary: No clear legal duty exists to accept qualification where constitutional/precedent requires appointment | Mandamus denied — no clear, ministerial duty to accept qualifying papers for a seat required to be filled by appointment |
| Whether courts should evaluate reasonableness/duration of the interim vacancy | Trotti: Courts should assess shortness of vacancy (one business day) and prefer election where vacancy is not "unreasonable" | Secretary: Reasonableness inquiry would be arbitrary and conflict with bright-line precedent tying vacancy/appointment to timing of qualifying | Court rejected a reasonableness test as unworkable; held bright-line rule controls (vacancy accepted before qualifying → appointment) |
| Whether Spector remains the controlling rule | Trotti: Spector supports election when resignation effective at term end; this case is analogous | Secretary: Spector is limited to resignations that create no interim vacancy; later cases limit/clarify Spector | Court: Spector is limited and does not control when acceptance occurs before qualifying; later advisory opinions govern, so appointment required |
Key Cases Cited
- Spector v. Glisson, 305 So.2d 777 (Fla. 1974) (prefers elective process where resignation is effective at end of term and no interim vacancy exists)
- In re Advisory Opinion to the Governor (Judicial Vacancies), 600 So.2d 460 (Fla. 1992) (a resignation accepted by the governor creates a vacancy even if effective in the future)
- Advisory Opinion to the Governor re Sheriff & Judicial Vacancies Due to Resignations, 928 So.2d 1218 (Fla. 2006) (vacancies occurring before qualifying must be filled by appointment)
- Advisory Opinion to the Governor re Judicial Vacancy Due to Resignation, 42 So.3d 795 (Fla. 2010) (same: vacancy before qualifying → appointment; vacancy after election process begins → election)
- Advisory Opinion to the Governor re Appointment or Election of Judges, 983 So.2d 526 (Fla. 2008) (establishes consistency principle and rejects varying outcomes based on year-to-year election process fluctuations)
- Pincket v. Harris, 765 So.2d 284 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000) (interprets Spector as limited to resignations that will not create interim vacancies)
- Fla. League of Cities v. Smith, 607 So.2d 397 (Fla. 1992) (mandamus may only enforce rights that are clearly and certainly established in law)