David P. Frankel v. District of Columbia Office for Planning and Economic Development, 110 A.3d 553

In 2009 Frankel requested ODMPED records under the D.C. FOIA; ODMPED failed to respond within the statutory period and Frankel sued in Jan. 2010 to compel a response.
ODMPED produced some records during litigation, filed a summary judgment motion with an affidavit and Vaughn index, and later supplemented both after Frankel challenged them.
The trial court ordered additional searches; ODMPED produced more documents (including a key document) and most pending motions were rendered moot; Frankel sought fees for his litigation work.
Frankel requested $45,836.14 in attorney’s fees; the trial court awarded about $20,313 and denied fees for time spent on three specific items (a Rule 11 demand never filed, a motion to strike an affidavit, and work on summary-judgment motions).
On appeal Frankel argued the trial court abused its discretion by denying fees for those tasks; the D.C. Court of Appeals considered whether the D.C. FOIA recognizes the "catalyst" theory and whether the denied hours were compensable.
The court held the catalyst theory applies to D.C. FOIA fee awards and reversed, concluding the denied categories of work were sufficiently causally connected, useful, and necessary to justify fee recovery.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether D.C. FOIA permits fee recovery under the "catalyst" theory	Frankel: FOIA allows fees where litigation causally prompts agency disclosure	ODMPED: Fees only when court awards relief; Buckhannon bars catalyst theory	Court: Catalyst theory applies; a causal nexus between suit and agency surrender satisfies § 2-537(c)
Whether time spent preparing a Rule 11 demand (never filed) is compensable	Frankel: Preparing and presenting the demand to opposing counsel prompted ODMPED corrections and is compensable	ODMPED: Unfiled motion per se non-compensable	Court: Compensable where demand produced the useful corrective action; fees allowed for that time
Whether time spent on a motion to strike an affidavit (denied) is compensable	Frankel: Motion prompted supplemental affidavits, an improved Vaughn index, expanded searches and productions	ODMPED: Motion unsuccessful, so fees should be denied	Court: Compensable because the motion was useful and necessary to obtaining the eventual disclosures
Whether time responding to ODMPED summary-judgment motion and filing cross-motion is compensable	Frankel: Opposition prevented dismissal and was causally necessary to obtaining documents; cross-motion intertwined with opposition work	ODMPED: Motions lacked merit; unsuccessful work not compensable	Court: Opposition work clearly compensable; cross-motion hours also compensable given intertwined nature of the work

Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep't of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S. 598 (U.S. 2001) (defines "prevailing party" and rejects catalyst theory in some statutory contexts)
McReady v. Dep't of Consumer & Regulatory Affairs, 618 A.2d 609 (D.C. 1992) (recognizes catalyst theory for D.C. FOIA fee awards)
Fraternal Order of Police v. District of Columbia, 52 A.3d 822 (D.C. 2012) (framework for FOIA fee-award analysis in D.C. and use of federal FOIA precedent)
Cooper v. U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd., 24 F.3d 1414 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (discusses compensability of time preparing pleadings denied leave to file)
Pennsylvania v. Del. Valley Citizens' Council for Clean Air, 478 U.S. 546 (U.S. 1986) (work is compensable if "useful and of a type ordinarily necessary" to achieve relief)
Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (U.S. 1983) (fee awards may include time on unsuccessful claims if time was expended to achieve overall relief)
Fox v. Vice, 131 S. Ct. 2205 (U.S. 2011) (clarifies compensability of work on successful and unsuccessful claims under fee-shifting principles)