*1 v. DELAWARE VALLEY PENNSYLVANIA et al. AIR et al. FOR CLEAN COUNCIL CITIZENS’ July 2, Argued March 1986 Decided 85-5. No. *2 J., opinion Court, J., delivered the in which
White, C. BurgeR, O’ConnoR, JJ., joined, Powell, Rehnquist, and Stevens, and in JJ., I and II of which BRENNAN, MARSHALL, Parts Blackmun, J., opinion joined. concurring part filed an Blackmun, and dissent- MARSHALL, J., part, joined, ing in which and in Part II of which J., joined, p. post, Brennan, argued petitioners.
Jay cause for With C. Waldman Henry Spencer A. him were G. Man- Barr, on the briefs thorpe, and John P. Krill. Hrubovcak, John M. Oberly
Kathryn argued A. the cause for the United States peti- support respondent Rule as under this 19.6 Court’s her on were Solicitor General Fried, tioners. With the brief Henry Deputy II, F. Habicht Solicitor General Getter. n James argued respondents. D. the cause for Crawford Meyers.* Joyce With him on the brief was S. opinion
Justice White delivered the of the Court. questions presented in this case first, The are whether the §7401 seq., Air 42 U. et attor- Act, Clean S. C. authorizes ney’s spent by participating fees awards time counsel *3 regulatory proceedings; may second, whether a court en- superior quality representation to hance an award reflect of by plaintiff’s and counsel; third, rendered whether enhance- *A of amici curiae filed for the Arizona et al. brief State of Massachusetts, Attorney of Bellotti, General X. Francis Suzanne E. Attorney General, Attorney Corbin, Assistant General Durrell, Robert K. Lieberman, Attorney Connecticut, Arizona, Joseph I. of General of Mi- Bowers, Attorney Georgia, General of Attor- Opper, chael Richard G. J. Guam, ney Attorney Watanabe, of General of General Ha- Corinne K. A. waii, Jones, Attorney Idaho, Hartigan, Attorney of General Neil F. Jim Illinois, Indiana, Attorney Pearson, General of General of Linley E. David Attorney Kentucky, Guste, of Jr., General Armstrong, L. William J. Attorney Louisiana, Attorney of General General of E. Tierney, James Maine, Attorney Sachs, Maryland, General of Stephen Kelley, H. Frank J. Attorney Michigan, General, of General Solicitor Caruso, Louis J. Attorney Mississippi, of Pittman, General Lloyd Edwin L. William Web- ster, Attorney Missouri, Merrill, Attorney General of E. General Stephen Attorney Hampshire, of North Lacy New General of Caro- Thornburg, H. lina, Spaeth, Attorney Dakota, Anthony General of North Nicholas J. J. Celebrezze, Jr., Attorney Ohio, Turpén, Attorney General of Michael C. Oklahoma, Medlock, Attorney General of General of South T. Travis Carolina, Vermont, Amestoy, Attorney General of Jeffrey L. William Broaddus, Attorney Virginia, General of Attor- Eikenberry, Kenneth ney Washington, Attorney Brown, General General West Charles G. Virginia, McClintock, Attorney Wyoming. and A. G. General of proper plaintiff’s
ment of the fee is pre- because risk of not vailing on the merits.
I Valley In 1977, the Delaware Citizens’ Council for Clean (Delaware Valley) Air and the United States filed each suit to compel Pennsylvania implement the Commonwealth of a inspection (I/M program vehicle emission and maintenance program) required by as Air Clean Act. See U. C.S. § approved 7410. Pursuant to a consent decree 1978, the agreed program Commonwealth to establish I/Man Philadelphia Pittsburgh by August counties areas Pennsylvania Department 1, 1980. The decree called for the (PennDOT) Transportation legislation instituting to seek system franchise I/M under which the Commonwealth would garage with inspec- contract owners for the establishment of legislature approve sys- tion If stations. failed to such a required promulgate tem, regu- then the decree PennDOT to allowing Pennsylvania certify private lations number of garage perform inspections. facilities to In addition, the provided Pennsylvania pay decree prior $30,000 for fees and costs incurred to the entry of the consent decree.
Entry only beginning of the consent decree marked story, implementation program this of the I/M did not smoothly. proceed simplicity’s sake, For will we summarize *4 developments phases, the relevant factual phase relating into nine with each aspect litigation. to a different Not only by parties is this the method used the and followed system analyzing requests courts, both lower but it is a appears pro- fees and costs that to be useful in litigation. tracted entry
Phase I. of decree, After the consent the Penn- sylvania Legislature system. enact a refused to franchise then, July had until decree, 1, Under the PennDOT 1979 to publish necessary regulations. the When to PennDOT failed comply, Valley moved to Delaware have the Commonwealth regula- published proposed contempt; the PennDOT held hearing on the motion. scheduled the however, before tions, finding from the Commonwealth refrained The court thus parties contempt, a to establish revised the but ordered program approved implementation of I/Mthe schedule consent decree. the published proposed the I/M PennDOT II. After
Phase Valley regulations, program continued monitor Delaware performance decree, under the consent the Commonwealth’s regulations pub- which were comments on the and submitted Pennsylvania Bulletin. lished the requested Commonwealth a 1979, III. In late the Phase delaying implementation of the I/M of the decree modification Valley’s approval, May program 1981. With until approved the extension March 1980. District Court February By 1981, the still Commonwealth Phase TV. covering type regulations published final had not private garages equipment needed to have order to which inspection The Commonwealth certified stations. become postpone- to a further consent thus asked January implementation date to 1983. The ment of the argued that the United States Environmen- Commonwealth type Agency emission tal Protection had recommended required analyzer from the one under consent different produced had decree, but at that time no manufacturer even machinery. prototype such request, negotiations this extension After extensive over agreement. parties failed reach an The Common- asking grant then filed a motion the District Court to wealth delay starting extension and date of the I/M the second January response, program In until Delaware Val- ley sought to have the court declare the Commonwealth to be requested decree, in violation the consent numerous May 20, 1981, to the consent decree. On modifications finding court issued an order the Commonwealth violation denying extension, motion for a further decree, *5 denying by Valley. the modifications submitted Delaware App. 25a-28a. On 16, June the court denied the Common approved May for wealth’s motion reconsideration, but 1, implementation pro 1982, as the new deadline for of the I/M gram. appealed 44a-49a. The Commonwealth both May and June both of orders, which were affirmed by Appeals. Valley the Court of Delaware Citizens’ Council (CA3), Clean Air Commonwealth, 2d 674 F. cert. for 459 U. denied, S. 905 Following Phase V. the District Court’s order of June Pennsylvania Assembly 16, General enacted a statute, prohibited H. B. 456, over the veto, Governor’s which expenditure of state funds the Executive Branch for the implementation program. of the Act I/M 5, Oct. 1981, No. 1981 Pa. Laws 4. PennDOT and remainder of promptly the Executive Branch ceased all activities related implementing publication program, except the I/M for regulations specifications establishing the final for the emis- analysis equipment by garage sions to be used owners wish- ing participate inspection as Pa. locations. Bull. 3519 (Oct. 1981). stay implementation
The Commonwealth moved to
light
Valley op-
consent decree in
of H.
B. 456.
posed
sought
motion,
the court
to have
declare the
contempt
apply
Commonwealth
sanctions. The court
stay
denied the
for
Commonwealth’s motion
held the
contempt.
Commonwealth in civil
Citizens’
Supp.
Commonwealth,
Council
533 F.
Clean Air v.
for
(ED
1982).
Pa.
As a
court ordered
United
sanction, Secretary
approving
Transportation
refrain from
States
any projects,
highways
awarding any grants, in the
or
except
projects
decree,
two areas
covered
the consent
required
purposes
safety,
transit,
mass
or air
again,
improvement.
Once
Id., at 884-885.
Common-
Appeals up-
appealed,
again, the Court of
wealth
and once
*6
552
(CA3),
held the (1982). S. 969 denied, U. city filing decree,
Phase VI. After the of consent Pennsylvania legislators Pittsburgh groups of several Valley litigation. attempted in the Delaware to intervene Valley attempts. successfully opposed these Delaware all of Commonwealth, 674 2d Air v. F. Clean Citizens’ Council for (1982). (CA3), stay denied, 458 U. S. portion above, noted the District Phase VII. As contempt prevented the United States Secre- order Court’s authorizing expenditure tary Transportation from highway projects Pennsyl- any federal funds for federal categories. In late that did not fall into certain vania approved projects funding, seven United States safety improve certifying they improve either or that would quality. certifications were submitted both These air Valley District The and the Court. court found Delaware exemptions qualify projects as under five of the did only pro- prior approved order, and two terms of its Valley funding. posals Citizens’ Coun- federal (ED Supp. Commonwealth, 551 F. Air v. cil Clean 1982). Pa. May Pennsylvania 3, 1983, On General
Phase VIII. finally passed legislation authorizing Assembly the Common- proceed implementation program, I/M with wealth day. signed the bill into law the next and the Governor §§4706-4707 Subsequently, Dela- Pa. Cons. Stat. Valley negotiated new the Commonwealth com- ware program begin pliance the I/M would schedule, under which approved The District Court of this new 1, 1984. June contempt vacated its earlier sanctions. schedule, and phase includes work done Delaware Phase IX. This Valley hearings before the Environmental Protection Agency, during alia, inter the Commonwealth unsuc- which,
cessfully sought agency’s approval program of an I/M covering geographic a smaller area.1 Valley sought attorney’s then fees and costs for performed the work after issuance of the consent decree in App. 50a-86a. The District Court awarded Dela- $209,813 ware fees additional (ED 1984). Supp. $6,675.03 in costs. 581 F. 1412, 1433 Pa. legal To calculate the fee award, District Court first *7 determined:
“[T]he
reasonably necessary
per-
number of hours
to
legal
compensation sought.
form the
services for which
is
multiplied by
The reasonable number of hours is then
hourly
attorney providing
reasonable
rate for the
the
being
services, the latter
on
based
the court’s determina-
attorney’s reputation,
type
tion of the
status and
of ac-
tivity
attorney
seeking compensation.
for which the
is
figures
The sum of the two
is the ‘lodestar’ which can
adjusted upward
then be
or downward based on the con-
tingency
success,
of an
plaintiffs
In
work.
all instances
have the burden of
establishing
any
entitlement to the award claimed and
phase
Valley
1 This
also includes work done
Delaware
in related
Pennsylvania
Burd v.
litigation.
Dept.
Transportation, 66
state-court
129,
(1982),
Pa. Commw.
The three court used found to be “most difficult” Work which court award. hourly compensated For rate of work $100. an was working “by attorney at the associ- an could have been done hourly rate set at And for work $65. was level,” ate ability,” legal required or no the court allowed “which little hourly Id., at 1422. rate of $25. Valley part, For the hours which Delaware the most spent postdecree sought compensation liti- were those Pennsylvania gation In II IX, however, Phases itself.2 seeking compensation objected that Delaware only tangentially related state and federal ad- done in work rejected proceedings. The this District Court ministrative regulations argument, proposed and found that because the Valley’s rights under the con- would have affected Delaware unique proceedings in the decree, it had a interest sent sufficiently litigation com- made its work related to be *8 pensable. id., at 1429-1430. See determining phases for all
After the “lodestar” amounts litigation, Valley’s the court next considered Delaware figures “multipliers” adjust request for to these “the con- 2 amounts, In determining the lodestar the District Court eliminated Valley. of the hours submitted Delaware more than one-third all they in these were eliminated because were documented Some of hours Supp., F. 1420-1421. were ex sufficient detail. at Additional hours spent by attorneys prepar court all time cluded because the disallowed attorney attending hearings in which another Delaware ing for or Id., Valley at 1421. court a principal was the advocate. The also denied proceedings it certain number of hours for activities related that found rights necessary protect Valley’s under the consent were not Finally, significant a number elimi at 1430. of hours were decree. spent particular that the time on the nated based the court’s conclusion “excessive,” less of time was activity was or amount “reasonable.” id., g., e. 1423, 1425, 1429. See case, nature of the
tingent the quality of the work performed Id., at 1431, citing results obtained.” Hensley Eckerhart, U. S. 434-435 Given that case involved new theories legal with little precedent, and that Delaware was forced Valley go up against both the Federal Government and the Commonwealth of Pennsylva- nia to obtain the consent decree initially then it protect from being overturned, court found contingent “[t]he na- ture of [Delaware Valley’s] [to success been have] apparent this throughout litigation.” 581 Supp., at 1431. The court also found that Delaware Valley’s work Phase V was during “superior,” and that an “[a]n increase based on the quality work which culminated result is outstanding fully justi- Ibid, (citation omitted). fied.”
Accordingly, the District Court applied multiplier two to the awards in IV, V, Phases and VII to reflect the low likelihood of success faced those stages of In litigation. addition, the court added a multi separate of two to Phase V to plier adjust lodestar for the high of representation provided The phase. final court’s calculation of the fee award each the nine was as follows:3 phases
Lodestar Total Multiplier Phase I Phase II Phase Phase Phase V III IV $ 27.372.50 36.711.50 4,478.50 1,745.00 1.722.50 I I $ 109,490.00 73,423.00 4,478.50 1,722.50 1,745.00 Phase Phase Phase Phase I—I I—IH hH H 5.370.50 1,453.00 1,560.00 1,820.00 10,741.00 1,453.00 1,820.00 1,560.00 *9 Valley $3,380 The District Court also awarded Delaware additional legal preparing in fees for the petition work done the fee itself. 581 F. Supp., at 1431. Appeals Third Circuit affirmed. 762 of for the
The Court 304(d) (1985). § analogized of the Clean F. The court 2d statutory- provides to Act, fees, Air for counsels’ other which jurisprudence provisions, and that “the fee held attorneys regarding of fees devel- the calculation reasonable attorneys par- oped fees with other connection statutes — brought §1988 ticularly applicable [42 C.] to cases U. S. —is 304(d).” § pursuant 2d, 762 F. at 275. to spent of com- affirmed the award fees for time The court proposed regulations menting on the Commonwealth’s Id., II stated the District Court. at Phase reasons Appeals agreed that the The of also fee 276-277. Court Valley in IX Phase for the time devoted award plan adoption proper of modification “because the state was Valley] impaired rights by [Delaware won would have Id., court took note of decree.” at 277. The the consent Dyer County, (1985), U. Board Ed. S. Webbv. of “optional spent held that time adminis- which this Court § may compensable proceedings” if be under 1988 the trative ordinarily necessary type and of a work was “both useful party litigation” point . . . to the where the suc- advance the Appeals 243. The found that the Id., at Court of ceeded. II and IX “was useful and neces- work of counsel Phases sary securing decree,” full enforcement of the and that phases two fee awards for these were the District Court’s at n. 2d., 277, with 762 F. consistent Webb. multipliers, Appeals respect the Court of use
With appli- that “this The rare case where the fee concluded was specific offer[ed] to show that the cant evidence reasonably superior to that one should service rendered hourly charged expect light rates and that the suc- quoting “exceptional.”’” Blum cess was approved The court also Stenson, 465 U. S. “contingency” multipliers compensate the use prevailing. The court for the risk of not stated:
557
Valley] specifically
[Delaware
Blum,
“Unlike
identified
litigation
in
in
the risks inherent
this
its brief to the dis
although
Supreme
and,
trict court
Court considers it
open question
contingency
whether
of success can
properly justify
increase,
a lodestar
we have resolved
question
Borough
in
Hall
this court. See
v.
Ro
of
(3d Cir.1984); Lindy [Brothers
The court also the Commonwealth’s specific findings failed make fact in the District Court to awarding multipliers, and the court abused its dis determining multipliers. in size of the cretion Ibid.4 (1985), granted and now affirm certiorari, We U. S. part. part in in and reverse I—I I—I 304(d) of the Air Act,
Section Clean Stat. 7604(d), § provides, pertinent part, as follows: U. S. C. issuing any any ‘The final order action court, (a) brought pursuant may section, to subsection of this litigation (including attorney costs of reasonable award fees) any expert party, to whenever the witness ” appropriate. court determines such award is argues plain language that the The Commonwealth litigation” clearly statute limits the award fees “costs the award Judge Becker dissented from the court’s affirmance of prevailing “simply in Phases and VII was multipliers. The risk of not IV multiplier justify very substantial awarded the dis insufficient court,” phases, had the burden of trict because both the Commonwealth 2d, seeking modify 762 F. n. 12. proof in the consent decree. V, that, Judge Becker multiplier of four used in Phase concluded As for the contingency multipliers appro assuming quality and is “even an award of , multipliers must be recalculated because the case was priate . . . Blum, extraordinary very justify light the award of this so rare as to Ibid, omitted). (citations multiplier.” brought” “action[s] that the lower Act, under the awarding Val- fees for Delaware courts erred ley’s II both of which involved IX, in Phases activities regulations to adminis- draft of comments on the submission *11 agencies. these asser- States echoes The United trative contemplated by the “actions” and contends tions, 304(d) proceedings. § judicial administrative actions, not are scope limiting reject on the constructions these We 304(d). § proceedings
Although in involved Phases true that the it is they “judicial” did not in the sense that II IX were not and legal work such or involve “traditional” in a courtroom occur jurors trial, selection of of witnesses or as examination by phases was as neces- counsel in these two work done adequate sary their relief for client as the attainment of which secured their earlier work the courtroom all of was obtaining Valley’s the consent de- initial success Delaware by single act a tortious cree. This case did involve injury to Delaware a discrete Commonwealth resulted Valley, alleged kind that couldbe reme- nor was the harm damages entry declaratory by or the a mere award of died Valley filed suit to force the Com- Delaware Instead, relief. obligations comply Air its under Clean monwealth to with inspection develop implement emissions and Act to surrounding covering program maintenance 10 counties two major metropolitan end, To this the consent decree areas. program provided to how the was to detailed instructions as specific by developed dates which these tasks be accomplished. to be were by scope afforded the consent
Protection of the full of relief safeguard the interests crucial to asserted decree thus by Valley; decree, of the whether and enforcement judge, regulatory or front of a in the courtroom before program power modify agency with the substance type is of work which court, involved ordered § litigation compensable In a properly under as cost remedy to enforce the necessary kind, measures case of this divorced from the cannot be the District Court ordered in securing Valley prevailed which matters upon the consent decree. that, the context of Civil have held
Several courts
C.
1976,
Act of
U. S.
Fees Awards
Attorney’s
Rights
decree is a com-
of a consent
monitoring
1988,
§
postjudgment
to a reasonable
counsel is entitled
for which
activity
pensable
Garrity
g.,
Sununu,
e.
727,
752 F. 2d
738-739
v.
See,
fee.
(CA7
Stanton,
Bond v.
1231,
630 F. 2d
(CA1
1984);
(CA5
Carson,
Miller 1980);
628 F. 2d
1980);
City
Memphis
Schools, 611 F.
Ed.
v. Board
Northcross
(CA6
First, and “proceeding” “action” used the words section, Congress g., e. 37 91-1196, No. p. S. See, Rep. interchangeably. Air Amendments of the Clean 1 History (1970); Legislative Committee on (Committee for the Senate compiled Print 1970 93-18, No. Ser. Congress), Library Public Works of the (1974) (Senate Con- Report 136 Consideration p. Hist.). 1970) The lack of 18, (Leg. Dec. Committee, ference 304(d) §of is not nec- on the face “or phrase proceedings” of the section. scope intended indicative of the essarily behind both the purposes importantly, and more Second, identical, which lends credence 304(d) nearly § 1988 are § and in a interpreted similar should be that they to the idea Memphis Board Ed., Northcross v. 412 S. U. manner. enacted to insure (1973). 1988 Section 427, to vindicate opportunity meaningful have a citizens private Hensley Acts. Rights the Civil protected their rights p. Rep. 94-1011, No. S., 461 U. at See S. Eckerhart, (1976). rights of Federal civil “The effective enforcement depends largely private citizens,” the efforts of statutes attorney’s be reasonable fees could awarded unless many legitimate Congress bringing actions, these found that Rep. 94-1568, H. R. No. claims would not be redressed. p. 1 304(a) any §
Similarly, private citizens to sue authorizes 304(d) § provides person violating Air Act, and the Clean Congress appropriate. fees whenever reasonable § encourage participation specifically to “citizen enacted 304 regulations of standards and established in the enforcement (1970), p. Rep. in- No. Act,” 91-1196, under this S. very “to . . . citizens . . . broad tended the section afford participate prevent opportunities the effort to and abate (SenateConsideration pollution.” Leg. p. Hist., air 1970)(re- Report Committee, of the Conference Dec. Eagleton). Congress found that “Government marks of Sen. seeking Air under the Clean Act has initiative enforcement Rep. urged restrained,” 91-1196, S. No. been legitimate “recognize bringing that in actions under courts to performing public citizens would be service and this section litigation in such instances the courts should award costs of party.” at 38. such 304(d) § § purpose common of both and 1988 to
Given the important policies, promote citizen enforcement of federal we interpret provisions governing at find no reason not to torney’s both hold, therefore, in the same manner. fees We *13 in II IX the fact that the work done counsel Phases judicial litigation in the context of traditional did not occur preclude attorney’s not an award of reasonable fees does 304(d) § during portions these the under for the work done present action.5 express judgment question no the whether an award of attor We
ney’s appropriate proceedings in there fees is federal administrative when no connected court action which fees are recoverable. is opinion This consistent conclusion is with our in Webb v. (1985). Dyer County, Board Ed. U. S. There, spent optional pursuing noted that for the time we adminis- proceedings properly trative to be the included calculation fee, reasonable must be work “useful and type ordinarily necessary” aof to secure the final result ob- litigation. Application from Id., tained at 243. of this Id., standard is left to the discretion of the court. district at 243-244. Court
Here, District found for Phase that, II, as Dela- unique proposed regulation ware had a interest compliance on a ensure “based desire to with the consent de- protect rights [its] and to cree thereunder. The usefulness [Delaware Valley’s] comments was manifested the revi- regulations.” original that were to the sions Supp., made 581 F. Similarly, at 1423. found court that counsel’s during helped protect work Phase IX the relief awarded any pro- decree, under consent as modification of the I/M gram Agency the Environmental Protection would have adversely Valley’s rights affected under the de- agree participation in cree. at 1430. We these ad- proceedings ministrative crucial to vindication of Valley’s rights under the decree consent and find compensation entirely proper these activities was “zone and well within the of discretion” afforded the District Hensley, supra, concurring 442 (Brennan, J., Court. part). part dissenting We affirm the thus award of for work in Phases II fees done and IX.
(h— HHI—I that, A It iswell under the American Rule, established ordinarily prevailing litigant “the is entitled to collect a Alyeska attorneys’ Pipeline fee from reasonable the loser.” Society, 421 Co. v. Wilderness U. S. Service exceptions principle, major being There are to this one *14 require congressional one authorization for the courts to attorney’s party fees to the other.6 There are over to award attorney’s providing separate for the award of statutes provisions variety although of these cover wide fees; and action, the benchmark for the awards contexts and causes nearly fee all of these statutes is that the under must be “reasonable.” struggled proper measure for have to formulate the
Courts
particular
determining
of a
fee award.
the “reasonableness”
by
employed
the Fifth Circuit
Johnson
method, first
One
(1974),
Georgia Highway Express,
This go determining propriety legal into the fees and ments statutory exception, traditionally recog have In addition to this courts First, exceptions “American nized three other other to the Rule.” courts by assessing attorney’s vi can their own orders fees for the wilfull enforce S., Second, Alyeska, 421 at 258. are olation of a court order. U. courts faith, empowered against losing party who has acted in bad to award fees Id., vexatiously, wantonly, oppressive or for reasons. at 258-259. And finally, equitable powers allow it to award fees in commercial liti a court’s a “common fund” for oth gation plaintiffs who recovered themselves and litigation. through securities or antitrust 257. None of these ers present involved in the case. situations are (2) (1) required; novelty time and labor the The 12 factors are: the (3) perform legal difficulty question; requisite the skill the service (4) attorney preclusion employment of other due to properly; (6) (5) fee; case; customary whether the is fixed or acceptance of the fee (7) imposed by circumstances; time limitations the client or the contingent; (9) (8) obtained; experience, repu results the amount involved and the (11) (10) attorney; “undesirability” case; tation, ability relationship client; length professional with the the nature and (12) 2d, 488 F. at 717-719. These factors were awards similar cases. Respon Bar Association Code of Professional taken from the American sibility, Disciplinary 2-106 Rule *15 provide appellate was intended to courts with more substan objective tial and records on which to trial review court supra, determinations. See Johnson, at 717. This mode of analysis, shortcomings. however, was not without its Its major gave very guidance fault was that it little actual to dis Setting attorney’s by trict courts. fees reference to a series subjective placed of sometimes factors unlimited discretion in judges produced disparate trial and results. developed
For this reason, the Third Circuit another calculating attorney’s method of “reasonable” fees. This approach, method, known as the “lodestar” involved two steps. First, the court was to calculate the “lodestar,” de- by multiplying spent termined the hours on a case a rea- hourly compensation attorney sonable rate of for each in- Lindy Philadelphia volved. Bros. Builders, Inc. v. Sanitary Corp., American Radiator & Standard 487 F. 2d (CA3 1973) I). (Lindy using 161, Second, the lodestar figure starting point, adjust- as a the court could then make “(1) figure, light contingent ments to this nature of reflecting case, the likelihood that hours were invested expenses compensation; incurred without assurance of (2) quality performed of the work as evidenced complexity recovery work observed, of the issues and the obtained.” Merola v. Atlantic Co., 515 F. 2d Richfield (CA3 1975);Lindy Philadelphia Builders, Bros. Inc. Sanitary Corp., American v. Radiator & Standard 540 F. 2d (CA3 1976) II). (Lindy empha- This formulation expended by attorneys, pro- sized the amount of time analytical vided more framework for lower courts to follow unguided approach provided by than the “factors” Johnson. allowing adjust hand, On the other the courts to the lodestar amount based on considerations of the “riskiness” of the law- attorney’s produce suit and the of the work could still arbitrary inconsistent and fee awards. question proper
We first addressed the
manner in
Hensley
to determine a
which
“reasonable”
fee in
hy-
adopted
there
Eckerhart,
U. S.
We
approach
shared
and the
brid
elements
both Johnson
starting
method of calculation. “The most useful
lodestar
point
determining
the amount of a reasonable fee is the
reasonably expended
litigation
on the
number of hours
plied by
multi-
hourly
provides
a reasonable
rate. This calculation
objective basis on which to make an initial
estimate of the
lawyer’s
of a
services.” 461
at 433.
S.,
value
U.
To this ex-
Hensley
the method endorsed
follows the Third
tent,
Cir-
description
step
approach.
cuit’s
of the first
of the lodestar
product
on to
“The
Moreover, we went
state:
of reasonable
*16
inquiry.
a
rate
hours times
reasonable
does not end the
may
There remain other considerations that
lead the district
adjust
upward
the fee
or
Id.,
court
downward. ...”
at
expansive
434. We then took a more
view of what those
might
noting
“[t]he
be, however,
“other considerations”
that
may
[the]
district court also
consider
factors
in
identified
Georgia Highway Express,
Inc.,
Johnson
uct of reasonable hours times a reasonable rate — wholly is “reasonable” fee consistent with the rationale be- fee-shifting including hind the usual statute, one present designed case. These as a statutes were form of improve attorneys, economic relief to the financial lot of nor they replicate exactly attorney were intended to the fee an through arrangement private earn fee with could his client. private par- Instead, the aim such statutes was to enable legal injuries *17 help seeking obtain in ties to redress for result- specific ing from the actual or threatened violation of federal plaintiffs, Valley, if such find Hence, laws. as Delaware it statutory possible engage lawyer to based on the assurance paid purpose fee,” he that will be a “reasonable the behind fee-shifting has been the statute satisfied. attorney accepts agrees
Moreover, first a case and when obligates perform represent the client, to the he himself to to ability produce possible of his and to the best best results with client’s Cal- commensurate his skill and his interests. culating in a that the fee award manner accounts for these determining factors, in the number hours either reasonable of litigation setting hourly expended on the or the reasonable compensates attorney, adequately leaves the and rate, thus post- enhancing very the award based his little room figure engagement performance. in- In the short, lodestar constituting a if not of the relevant factors most, all, cludes unnecessary to enhance fee, and it is “reasonable” superior performance in serve the statu- fee order to the tory legal enabling plaintiffs purpose to secure assistance. of B teaching prior mind, our cases in sustain from we With this that the lower courts erred the Commonwealth’s contention increasing the Phase V fee award to “superior performance. quality” of on the counsel’s based upward adjust- Relying in Blum that an on the statement applicant may justified in the case where the fee ment be rare quality specific that the of service evidence show offers reasonably superior expect one should rendered was light hourly charged rates and that the success “exceptional,” the Third Circuit both the District affirmed findings concerning “superior quality” Dela- Court’s of Valley’s V, work in Phase ware ing counsel’s “outstand- phase holding its in- result” obtained this that an portion crease this of the lodestar a factor two was appropriate. 2d, 762 F. at 280-282. agree. concerning
We cannot Because considerations quality prevailing party’s representation of a counsel’s nor- mally hourly rate, reflected in are the reasonable the overall quality performance ordinarily adjust used should not be removing any danger counting.” thus lodestar, “double unpersuaded
Furthermore, we are lodestar fully amount determined for Phase in this case did re- V competence legal flect the services ren- portion Valley’s lawyers. this dered For litigation, sought compensation approximately counsel Supp., F. these, 620 hours of work. 581 1427. Of *18 compensation District allowed for hours. The Dis- Court large trict Court’s elimination of a number of hours on the grounds they unnecessary, that were un- unreasonable, or productive supportive is not of the court’s later conclusion remaining represented “superior the that hours work of quality.” compensated, also note
We that the 324 hours 26 hours compensated per were hour, at $25 hours were billed at an hourly remaining paid rate of $65, and the 210 hours were at per By hour. at Id., $100 1427-1428. the defi- court’s own applied required nition, the rate was work “which little $25 legal ability,” proper no or $65 rate was work for by attorney working “that have could been done an at the as- nearly sociate level.” at 1422. Given that one-third reasonably spent phase all the hours on this com- were not hourly pensated at rate work for which the court found to quality be “most difficult,” it is hard to see what made the representation “superior” for those hours so that it was hourly reflected in the rate used to determine the lodestar amount. This conclusion is reinforced fact expressly hourly Third Circuit that the for found rate $100 attorney compensated ap- “plainly the 210 hours was propriate” “inexperienced attorne[y]” given he was prior “any significant litigation experience.” F. without (District Supp., at n. 2d, F. See also 581 reputation status, Court set fees based evaluation of “the experience attorneys performed of the individual who activity”). viewing
In sum, the evidence submitted Val- ley support petition no its is fees, there why provide indication as to did not lodestar reasonable reflecting representation provided fee award Valley during Clearly, litigation. Phase V of the any promise able obtain counsel without of reward extraordinary performance. Furthermore, Delaware specific presented it as to no evidence what made the results pro- during phase “outstanding,” obtained this so nor did it *19 figure portion any for that the lodestar this of vide indication far in cases case was below awards made similar where the performance. equally superior quality Fi- of the court found nally, Appeals the of neither the District Court nor Court why findings made as the lodestar amount was un- detailed to why quality repre- particular, the in as to of reasonable, and product of in the the reasonable sentation was not reflected hourly the reasonable rate. In the number of hours times findings, find no evidence and such we reason absence of such in award Phase V for the of to increase fee representation.
IV upward adjustment, question by way remains the of There multipliers of lodestar, or enhancement based on the way, put or to it success, likelihood of another the risk loss. open question in This is the that we left Blum and on which Appeals entirely are the Courts of not accord. We are of that our resolution of issue would be benefited view by reargument it and hence we do not decide now. Accord- ingly, restoring argument issue the case an order will to question attorney’s docket insofar as it raises the whether losing chargeable Air fees defendant under the Clean Act comparable may statutes be and the enhanced based on the so, and if extent. loss, risk what judgment up- The below is therefore affirmed insofar as it held fees for the work the award done Phases multiplier except II IX and, risk, is otherwise reversed.
It sois ordered. .with whom Justice Blackmun, Justice Marshall joins, joins and with whom Justice as to II, Part Brennan concurring part dissenting part. HH adjudication piecemeal
I from dissent of the issues just part this I would set entire case, case. reargument judgment next it, Term. This rush only certain issues will serve to confuse the federal courts until the entire case is decided. But the Court insists on covering part, the merits I and so turn to them.
HH I—I only join opinion. I I Parts and II oxthe s In Court Part *20 purports III, the Court to follow Blum Stenson, v. U. S. (1984), adjustment quality in which we held that an applicant was “in available the rare case where the fee offers specific quality evidence to show that the of service rendered superior reasonably expect light was to that one should hourly charged ‘excep- rates and that the success was citing Hensley 899, tional.’” at v. Eckerhart, U. S. today, improperly The 424, 435 Court however, heightens showing required point may to the where it be virtually impossible plaintiff Compare for a to meet. Blum, supra, at 899, with ante, at 567-568.
Although the District Court’s decision issued before adjustment quality its Blum, Phase V was in full accord subsequently with the standards laid down Blum. Com- (ED pare 1984), Supp. F. Pa. with 465 U. S., proper at 899. The of an standard review fee award is abuse Evans D., of discretion. U. S. Jeff (1986); supra, I 742-743 at Blum, do not think the multiplying by District Court its discretion two abused adjust quality. lodestar for Phase V order to If the majority applied proper, deferential standard of review substituting judgment on the issue rather than its may ante, that of the District Court, 566-567, see it have result I do. reached same as