David Keen v. State of Tennessee, W2016-02463-CCA-R3-ECN

David Keen was convicted in 1991 of first-degree murder and aggravated rape for the rape and murder of an eight-year-old; he received death and a 20-year sentence.
Keen has pursued repeated post-conviction and coram nobis challenges asserting intellectual disability to avoid execution; prior efforts (including a 2001 post-conviction petition and a 2010 motion to reopen) were denied.
In 2015 Keen filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis asserting intellectual disability, supported by several expert reports obtained over 2008–2013.
The coram nobis court denied relief, relying on Payne v. State to hold coram nobis is not the proper vehicle for intellectual-disability claims and finding the petition untimely.
Keen appealed, arguing Payne was wrongly decided (and effectively overruled by Montgomery), that his coram nobis petition was timely (or tolling applied), and that Rule 36.1 relief is available because his sentence is illegal.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether coram nobis may be used to raise intellectual-disability claim to avoid execution	Keen: coram nobis is appropriate to present new expert evidence showing intellectual disability	State: Payne precludes coram nobis for intellectual-disability claims; coram nobis targets materially incorrect facts, not law changes	Denied — Payne controls; coram nobis not cognizable for this claim
Whether Payne has been effectively overruled by Montgomery v. Louisiana	Keen: Montgomery undermines Payne and allows his claim	State: Only Tennessee Supreme Court can overrule Payne; intermediate court must follow Payne	Rejected — appellate court bound by Payne; Montgomery argument unavailing here
Timeliness of the coram nobis petition (statute of limitations/tolling)	Keen: newly obtained expert evidence justifies tolling or makes petition timely	State: Expert reports were obtained years before filing; petition effectively repackaged prior claims and is untimely	Denied — petition untimely; not saved by tolling given long delays
Rule 36.1 relief for illegal sentence based on intellectual disability	Keen: Rule 36.1 permits correction because execution would be illegal for intellectually disabled	State: Issue not raised below; procedural default	Denied — waived for failure to raise in trial court

Payne v. State, 493 S.W.3d 478 (Tenn. 2016) (coram nobis not appropriate to raise intellectual-disability challenges to death sentence)
Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (U.S. 2016) (retroactivity principles invoked by Keen as undermining Payne)
Harris v. State, 301 S.W.3d 141 (Tenn. 2010) (coram nobis limitations principles)
State v. Wilson, 367 S.W.3d 229 (Tenn. 2012) (due-process tolling for newly discovered evidence of actual innocence)
Workman v. State, 41 S.W.3d 100 (Tenn. 2001) (balancing interests in statute-of-limitations tolling)
Sands v. State, 903 S.W.2d 297 (Tenn. 1995) (Burford three-step rule for limitations start and later-arising grounds)
Burford v. State, 845 S.W.2d 204 (Tenn. 1992) (due process may toll filing periods to allow meaningful presentation)
State v. Coleman, 341 S.W.3d 221 (Tenn. 2011) (discussed as not creating a new constitutional right relevant to Keen)
Keen v. State, 398 S.W.3d 594 (Tenn. 2012) (prior appellate history addressing Keen’s intellectual-disability assertions)
State v. Keen, 926 S.W.2d 727 (Tenn. 1994) (direct-appeal resentencing remand)
State v. Keen, 31 S.W.3d 196 (Tenn. 2000) (affirming later death sentence on direct appeal)