Cyrus Deville WILSON v. STATE of Tennessee.
Supreme Court of Tennessee, at Nashville.
Feb. 16, 2012 Session. April 20, 2012.
229-237
Rоbert E. Cooper, Jr., Attorney General and Reporter; William E. Young, Solicitor General; and Mark A. Fulks, Senior Counsel, Nashville, Tennessee for the appellant, State of Tennessee. Patrick Timothy McNally, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellee, Cyrus Deville Wilson.
SHARON G. LEE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which CORNELIA A. CLARK, C.J., JANICE M. HOLDER, GARY R. WADE, and WILLIAM C. KOCH, JR., JJ., joined.
On February 1, 1994, a jury found the petitioner, Cyrus Deville Wilson, guilty of first degree murder. The trial court sentenced him to life in prison. Petitioner’s conviction and sentence were affirmed on appeal. State v. Wilson, No. 01C01-9408-CR-00266, 1995 WL 676398 (Tenn. Crim. App. Nov. 15, 1995), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Mar. 25, 1996). In 1996, he filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging ineffective assistance of counsel and due process violations. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court dismissed the petition but failed to state its findings of fact and conclusions of law as required by
On August 25, 2009, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis alleging that on August 26, 2008, he obtained a сopy of the prosecutor’s file in his case that included a “RESUME OF FACTS” handwritten by an assistant district attor-
The trial court tolled the one-year statute of limitations on due process grounds but dismissed the petition without an evidentiary hearing. The trial court ruled that the assistant district attorney’s note constituted work product that was not subject to disclosure. The Court of Criminal Appeals, concluding that the State had waived the statute of limitations as a defense because it did not raise the issue in the trial court, reversed and remanded for an evidentiary hearing on the merits of the petition. Wilson v. State, No. M2009-02241-CCA-R3-CO, 2011 WL 1344519, at *2, *3 (Tenn. Crim. App. Apr. 6, 2011). We granted the State’s application for permission to appeal.
As a preliminary matter, the State argues that the petition was not timely filed and that the trial court erred in tolling the statute of limitations. Petitioner argues that the State waived the statute of limitations defense by not raising it in the trial court and that the trial court properly tolled the statute of limitations.
A petition for writ of error coram nobis must be presented to the court within one year after the judgment becomes final.
Although the State bears the burden of raising the statute of limitations as an affirmative defense, Harris, 301 S.W.3d at 144, its failurе to do so does not necessarily result in a waiver. Failure to raise the statute as an affirmative defense does not result in waiver “if the opposing party is given fair notice of the defense and an opportunity to rebut it” because “the purpose of the specific pleading requirement is to prevent a party from raising a defense at the last possible moment and thereby prejudicing the opposing party’s opportunity to rebut the defense.” Sands v. State, 903 S.W.2d 297, 299 (Tenn. 1995). Because Petitioner raised the issue of the statute of limitations by requesting that it be tolled on due process grounds, he cannot reasonably contend that he was prejudiced because he was not given fair notiсe of the defense or an opportunity to rebut it.
The one-year statute of limitations for a petition for writ of error coram nobis may be tolled on due process grounds if a petition seeks relief based upon newly discovered evidence of actual innocence. Harris, 301 S.W.3d at 145 (citing Workman v. State, 41 S.W.3d 100, 101 (Tenn. 2001)). In determining whether tolling of the statute is proper, the сourt is required to balance the petitioner’s interest in having a hearing with the interest of the State in preventing a claim that is stale and groundless. Harris, 301 S.W.3d at 145 (citing Workman, 41 S.W.3d at 103). Generally, “before a state may terminate a claim for failure to comply with ... statutes of limitations, due process requires that potential litigants be provided an opportunity for the presentation of claims at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner.” Burford v. State, 845 S.W.2d 204, 208 (Tenn. 1992). The Burford rule consists of three steps:
(1) determine when the limitations period would normally have begun to run; (2) determine whether the grounds for relief actually arose after the limitations period would normally have commenced; and (3) if the grounds are “later-arising,” determine if, under the facts of the case, a strict application of the limitations period would effectively deny the petitioner a reasonable opportunity to present the claim.
Applying this analysis, the limitations period would have begun to run on March 7, 1994, which was thirty days after the trial court entered its judgment of conviction. See Harris, 301 S.W.3d at 144. Petitioner obtained the district attorney’s file containing the allеged newly discovered evidence on August 26, 2008, which was after the limitations period commenced. A strict application of the limitations period would effectively deny Petitioner a reasonable opportunity to present his claim. Petitioner filed his petition for writ of error coram nobis less than one year after he gained access to the prosecutor’s file containing the assistant prosecutor’s note. Based on our review of these factors, the trial court did not err in tolling the statute of limitations.
We now address the primary issue presented in this case—whether the evidence asserted by Petitioner is sufficient to support a petition for writ of error coram nobis. The purpose of a writ of error coram nobis is to bring to the court’s attention a previously unknown fact that, had it been known, would have resulted in
Upon a showing by the defendant that the defendant was without fault in failing to present certain evidence at the proper time, a writ of error coram nobis will lie for subsequently or newly discovered evidence relating to matters which were litigated at the trial if the judge determines that such evidence may have resulted in a different judgment, had it been presented at trial.
The reliеf sought by a defendant in a petition for writ of error coram nobis “is an extraordinary remedy known more for its denial than its approval.” Harris v. State, 102 S.W.3d 587, 592 n. 7 (Tenn. 2003) (quoting Mixon, 983 S.W.2d at 666). It is within the sound discretion of the trial court to grant or deny a petition for writ of error coram nobis, Harris, 301 S.W.3d at 144 (citing State v. Vasques, 221 S.W.3d 514, 527-28 (Tenn. 2007)), and therefore, our review of this issue is limited to determining whether the trial court abused its discretion. Harris, 301 S.W.3d at 149 (Koch, J., concurring) (citing Freshwater, 160 S.W.3d at 553). A court abuses its discretion when it applies an incorrect legal standard or its decision is illogical or unreasonable, is based on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence, or utilizes reasoning that results in an injustice to the complaining party. Wright ex rel. Wright v. Wright, 337 S.W.3d 166, 176 (Tenn. 2011).
When a trial court addresses a petition for writ of error coram nobis, it must find that the subsequently or newly disсovered evidence “may have resulted in a different judgment, had it been presented at the trial.”
An attorney’s work product consists of those internal reports, documents, memoranda, and other materials that the attorney has prepared or collected in anticipation of trial. State v. Hunter, 764 S.W.2d 769, 770 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1988), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Jan. 30, 1989). The assistant district attorney’s handwritten note recording her impressions as to the credibility of witnesses qualifies as a memorandum prepared in anticipation of trial and therefore, constitutes work product. “The central purpose of the work product doctrine is to protect an attorney’s preparation for trial under the adversary system.” Swift v. Campbell, 159 S.W.3d 565, 572 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004). The doctrine is based on an attorney’s right to conduct his or her client’s case with a certain degree of privacy, preventing the discovery of materials prepared by opposing counsel in anticipation of litigation and protecting from disclosure an adversary’s “mental impressions, conclusions, and legal theories of the case.” Memphis Publ’g Co. v. City of Memphis, 871 S.W.2d 681, 689 (Tenn. 1994). The
Petitioner argues that even if the assistant prosecutor’s note is protectеd from disclosure, her duty to disclose exculpatory evidence persisted irrespective of the form in which the evidence was recorded—that it is the content of the note, i.e., the information that the juvenile witnesses had repeatedly lied, and not the note itself, which threatens the validity of the jury’s verdict. This argument, however, fails because the notе at issue and its content are inextricably linked; the note itself is the only proof of its content and without the note, there is nothing to support Petitioner’s allegation that there was undisclosed exculpatory evidence.
The trial court ruled that the assistant district attorney’s note was work product that the State was not required to disclose. While this ruling was correct, it was not dispositive because discoverability and admissibility are separate matters. See Roy v. City of Harriman, 279 S.W.3d 296, 301 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2008) (“[Wjhether the document is discoverable is not directly relevant. What matters is whether the document would be admissible at trial.”). The law in this state and elsewhere, however, supports the conclusion that, as work product, the assistant district attorney’s note was both non-discoverable and inadmissible. See Mitchell v. Jennings, 836 S.W.2d 575, 581 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992) (“It was stipulated in the bench-side conference that this statement was work product, and we agree that the trial court was correct in holding that the statement was inadmissible and not obtainable by counsel.”); State v. Mingo, 77 N.J. 576, 392 A.2d 590, 594 (1978) (“[Wjork product is inherently inadmissible.”); Am. Nat’l Red Cross v. Vinton Roofing Co., 629 F.Supp.2d 5, 8 (D.D.C. 2009) (“The work product doctrine provides that, generally, information рroduced or obtained in anticipation of litigation is inadmissible discovery.”). Notwithstanding this general rule of inadmissibility, we recognize that in the discovery context, a distinction is made between “ordinary or fact work product” and “opinion work product” and that ordinary or fact work product may be discoverable upon a showing of substantial need and undue hardship. See Boyd, 88 S.W.3d at 221. The work product at issue in the present matter is opinion work product, which is never discoverable and is therefore inadmissible. See