998 F.3d 782
7th Cir.2021Background
- In 2005 prosecutors Koester and Kopp moved to add a criminal confinement charge nine days after Indiana’s omnibus-date cutoff; Jones’s trial occurred about eight months later and he was convicted and heavily sentenced (20 years on confinement, enhanced by habitual-offender sentencing).
- Indiana law (and Haak v. State) treats substantive amendments made after the omnibus date as impermissible; Jones’s trial counsel did not object to the untimely amendment.
- Jones obtained federal habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in Jones v. Zatecky (7th Cir. 2019), holding his counsel’s failure to object was ineffective assistance; he was released in 2019.
- After release Jones sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983: (1) deputy prosecutors Koester and Kopp in their individual capacities for malicious prosecution and abuse of process, and (2) Madison County Prosecutor Rodney Cummings in his official capacity for adopting a policy of ignoring Indiana’s amendment limits; he sought damages including $50 million.
- The district court dismissed: (a) Cummings in his official capacity is a state official and thus not a “person” under § 1983 (Will), and (b) the deputies are entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity for filing/amending charges (Imbler). The Seventh Circuit affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether County Prosecutor Cummings (official capacity) is a “person” under § 1983 | Cummings is a county/local official subject to § 1983 municipal/official-capacity suit | Cummings is an arm of the State of Indiana; Eleventh Amendment/Will bars suit against state officials | Cummings is a state official; suit in official capacity is effectively against the State and is barred under Will |
| Whether deputies Koester and Kopp are entitled to absolute prosecutorial immunity for filing/amending charges | Their conduct was “rogue” and unlawful so only qualified immunity should apply | Filing and amending charges are core quasi‑judicial prosecutorial functions that draw absolute immunity (Imbler/Buckley) | Absolute prosecutorial immunity applies regardless of alleged motive; the deputies are immune |
| Whether violating state law (untimely amendment) gives rise to a federal due-process § 1983 claim | The state‑law violation deprived Jones of Fourteenth Amendment due process | A state‑law violation alone does not necessarily create a federal due‑process violation; no plausible prejudice is alleged | No federal due‑process claim plausibly alleged: the amendment occurred ~8 months before trial and Jones did not allege prejudice; § 1983 fails on the merits too |
| Whether courts should adopt a new rule limiting absolute immunity when prosecutors act unlawfully | Jones asked the court to restrict absolute immunity for unlawful prosecutorial acts | Defendants urged fidelity to Supreme Court immunity precedents | Court declined to create new rule; motives/unlawfulness do not defeat absolute immunity for quasi‑judicial functions |
Key Cases Cited
- Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989) (states and state officials sued in official capacity are not “persons” under § 1983)
- Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976) (absolute immunity for prosecutors for actions intimately associated with judicial phase)
- Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (municipal liability principles for § 1983 claims)
- Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259 (1993) (functional approach distinguishing absolute vs. qualified immunity)
- Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478 (1991) (prosecutors acting as investigators/administrators receive only qualified immunity)
- Collins v. City of Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115 (1992) (§ 1983 requires deprivation of rights secured by the Constitution or federal law)
- Jones v. Zatecky, 917 F.3d 578 (7th Cir. 2019) (habeas relief for ineffective assistance of counsel based on failure to raise state‑law issue)
- Tobey v. Chibucos, 890 F.3d 634 (7th Cir. 2018) (motive irrelevant where conduct is protected by absolute immunity)