David J McQueer v. Perfect Fence Company
917 N.W.2d 584
Mich.2018Background
- McQueer, an on‑the‑books intermittent laborer for Perfect Fence, was struck in the head by a Bobcat bucket while installing fence posts and is receiving WDCA benefits.
- After the accident McQueer alleges coworkers and company representatives told him not to report the injury as work‑related because he was "not on the books," and he claims he was pressured to pose as an independent contractor.
- McQueer sued Perfect Fence in circuit court for negligence and sought civil damages under MCL 418.171(4) (coercing employees to pose as contractors) and for violation of MCL 418.611; he also moved to amend to add an intentional‑tort claim.
- Trial court granted summary disposition for defendant, holding WDCA exclusive remedy barred the civil action and denying leave to amend as futile.
- Court of Appeals reversed, finding a factual question under MCL 418.171(4) and that amendment to add an intentional‑tort claim was improperly denied.
- Michigan Supreme Court majority reversed the Court of Appeals: it held § 418.171(4) applies only within the statutory principal–contractor–contractor’s‑employee (tripartite) framework, and McQueer—being defendant’s direct employee—cannot invoke § 171(4). The Court declined further review of the intentional‑tort issue.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether MCL 418.171(4) permits a direct employee to sue an employer who coerced the employee to pose as a contractor | § 171(4) targets employers who coerce employees to pose as contractors to evade WDCA; applies to direct‑employee coercion | § 171(4) is part of a statutory‑employer scheme limited to a principal–contractor–contractor’s‑employee relationship; McQueer was defendant’s direct employee so § 171 doesn’t apply | Majority: § 171 applies only where a contractor engages employees (tripartite relationship); § 171(4) unavailable to direct employees — reversed COA on that point |
| Whether the trial court erred denying leave to amend to add an intentional‑tort claim | Amendment should be allowed; factual disputes (warnings, misconduct, post‑accident statements) could support intentional‑tort exception to WDCA exclusivity | Amendment futile: no evidence employer specifically intended injury or had actual knowledge that injury was certain and willfully disregarded it | Concurrence (Zahra, J.): would deny amendment as futile—no evidence of specific intent or certainty of injury; COA reversal on amendment not supported (Court declined to review further) |
| Whether plaintiff showed facts creating genuine issue under § 418.611 (failure to secure compensation) | Employer attempted to evade coverage by instructing not to report and not listing worker | Employer had workers’ compensation insurance that covered McQueer and benefits were paid | Court: § 418.611 not violated because defendant had coverage that applied; COA correctly rejected § 611 claim |
| Proper method of statutory construction for § 418.171(4) | Read § 171(4) in context to effectuate remedial purpose protecting workers | Read § 171 as whole; subsections (1)–(3) limit § 171(4) to tripartite cases; "principal" has specialized meaning | Majority: interpret statute as whole; § 171(3) limits application; do not extend § 171(4) beyond tripartite statutory‑employer scheme |
Key Cases Cited
- Smitter v. Thornapple Twp., 494 Mich. 121 (Mich. 2013) (standards for de novo review in workers' compensation cases)
- Lash v. Traverse City, 479 Mich. 180 (Mich. 2007) (statutory construction principles; look to plain language)
- Travis v. Dreis & Krump Mfg. Co., 453 Mich. 149 (Mich. 1996) (standard for intentional‑tort exception under WDCA: specific intent or actual knowledge that injury is certain and willful disregard)
- Gray v. Morley, 460 Mich. 738 (Mich. 1999) (proof that injury was "certain to occur" requires more than repeated risky conduct)
- West v. Gen. Motors Corp., 469 Mich. 177 (Mich. 2003) (summary‑judgment standard: when a genuine issue of material fact exists)
- State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Old Republic Ins. Co., 466 Mich. 142 (Mich. 2002) (avoid interpretations that render statutory language surplusage)