David Babcock v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 959 F.3d 210

David Babcock was a National Guard dual‑status technician (federal civilian employee who also maintained Guard membership); he worked 33+ years, retired in 2009, and received a CSRS pension and separate military retirement pay.
Dual‑status technicians are statutory federal civilian employees eligible for CSRS; some of their military pay (active duty/inactive training after 1987) is Social Security covered, but most civilian GS pay was noncovered for pre‑1984 hires.
Babcock applied for Social Security benefits in 2014; SSA granted benefits but reduced them under the Windfall Elimination Provision (WEP) because of his CSRS pension.
Babcock sought reconsideration arguing a 1994 uniformed‑services exception (payments “based wholly on service as a member of a uniformed service”) exempted his CSRS pension; SSA denied relief (Petersen v. Astrue had held the exception applied to technicians in the Eighth Circuit; Martin v. SSA held the opposite).
The district court found Martin more persuasive and rejected Babcock’s due‑process/equal‑protection claims arising from a circuit split; the Sixth Circuit affirmed, holding a dual‑status technician’s CSRS pension is not a payment based wholly on uniformed‑service work and the WEP applies.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether a CSRS pension based on dual‑status technician employment qualifies as “a payment based wholly on service as a member of a uniformed service” under 42 U.S.C. § 415(a)(7)(A)(III).	Babcock: His CSRS pension is entirely based on dual‑status service, which is effectively military in nature, so the uniformed‑services exception applies and WEP should not reduce benefits.	Commissioner: CSRS is a civilian pension by statute and is not based wholly on service in the capacity of a uniformed‑service member; the exception therefore does not apply and the WEP applies.	The court held the exception does not apply: a dual‑status technician’s CSRS pension is a civilian payment (not “wholly” uniformed‑service based), so WEP reduction is proper.

Petersen v. Astrue, 633 F.3d 633 (8th Cir. 2011) (held the uniformed‑services exception applied to dual‑status technicians in the Eighth Circuit)
Martin v. Social Security Admin., Comm’r, 903 F.3d 1154 (11th Cir. 2018) (held the exception does not apply when employment is not wholly military in nature)
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (framework for deference in agency statutory interpretation)
Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950) (military‑service tort context; cited for the limited relevance of Feres‑line military characterizations)
Fisher v. Peters, 249 F.3d 433 (6th Cir. 2001) (characterized National Guard technician duties as irreducibly military for Feres purposes)
Comm’r v. Clark, 489 U.S. 726 (1989) (principle that exceptions to a general statutory rule are construed narrowly)