982 F.3d 20
1st Cir.2020Background
- Wanda E. Daumont-Colón, a 60-year-old branch manager at Cooperativa de Ahorro y Crédito de Caguas, admitted she signed her husband's (a member’s) name on withdrawal slips on at least eight occasions, including an unauthorized February 20, 2015 transaction.
- The Credit Union investigated, concluded Daumont was not an authorized signatory for the line of credit, and fired her on March 10, 2015, citing its rule prohibiting falsification of official documents (a rule prescribing dismissal even for a first offense).
- Daumont sued under the ADEA and Puerto Rico statutes (Law 100 — age discrimination; Law 80 — wrongful discharge). The parties proceeded to jury trial before a magistrate judge.
- The district court initially denied the Credit Union’s summary judgment and in limine motions without prejudice, but at trial excluded Daumont’s proposed comparator evidence as not similarly situated and, at the close of Daumont’s case, granted the Credit Union’s Rule 50(a) motion for judgment as a matter of law, dismissing all remaining claims.
- Daumont appealed, arguing (1) the district court violated the law-of-the-case doctrine by revisiting pretrial rulings, (2) the exclusion of comparator evidence was erroneous, and (3) the JMOL on her federal and state claims was improper. The First Circuit affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Law-of-the-case: could district revisit pretrial rulings? | Denial of motion in limine/summary judgment became law of the case; court could not exclude comparators or grant JMOL. | Interlocutory rulings are revisable; district court may reconsider evidentiary rulings at trial. | Court may revisit interlocutory rulings; no abuse of discretion in reappraising admissibility and granting JMOL. |
| Exclusion of comparator evidence | Comparator evidence would show disparate treatment and pretext; exclusion usurped jury factfinding. | Proposed comparators were not similarly situated in material respects (position, misconduct severity, repeat offenses). | District court did not abuse discretion; comparators were materially different and probative value was low. |
| JMOL on ADEA claim | Pretext shown (disparate discipline for others like Santos) permitted a reasonable jury to find age was the but-for cause. | Daumont admitted repeated falsification; rules prescribed termination; no evidence of age animus or that employer did not believe misconduct. | JMOL proper — no legally sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could find but-for age discrimination. |
| JMOL on Law 100 and Law 80 claims | (Law 100) age discrimination under local law; (Law 80) termination without just cause. | (Law 100) coextensive with ADEA; (Law 80) employer had reasonable basis to believe misconduct established just cause. | Law 100 fails for same reasons as ADEA; Law 80 fails because employer reasonably believed misconduct occurred and rules supported discharge. |
Key Cases Cited
- Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605 (supersession and general description of law-of-the-case doctrine)
- Luce v. United States, 469 U.S. 38 (in limine rulings are revisable at trial)
- Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (distinguishing evidence for summary judgment vs trial admissible evidence)
- McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (burden-shifting framework for discrimination claims)
- Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (pretext and burden of proof at third stage of McDonnell Douglas)
- Gross v. FBL Financial Services, Inc., 557 U.S. 167 (ADEA requires but-for causation)
- Vélez v. Thermo King de P.R., Inc., 585 F.3d 441 (similarly situated comparator standard in the First Circuit)
- Perkins v. Brigham & Women's Hosp., 78 F.3d 747 (definition of "similarly situated" in comparator analysis)