Darrell Walker v. United States, 900 F.3d 1012

Background

Darrell Walker was convicted in 2004 of felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition and sentenced in 2005 to 293 months under the ACCA based on prior Missouri burglary convictions.
Walker’s first § 2255 motion was denied in 2009; he sought authorization for a successive § 2255 after Johnson invalidated the ACCA residual clause and Welch made Johnson retroactive.
The Eighth Circuit granted preliminary authorization in 2016 but the district court later denied relief, finding Walker’s Missouri burglary convictions qualified as ACCA predicates under the enumerated‑offenses clause (as then-understood).
The central factual gap: the original sentencing record is silent as to whether the court relied on the ACCA residual clause or another clause (e.g., the enumerated‑offenses or force clause).
The Eighth Circuit holds that a movant seeking relief under Johnson in a successive § 2255 must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the sentencing court relied on the residual clause; factual determination is for the district court.

Issues

Issue	Walker's Argument	Government's Argument	Held
Whether Walker's successive § 2255 "relies on" Johnson's new rule so as to satisfy § 2255(h)	Johnson's invalidation of the residual clause removes the ACCA predicate and thus his motion "relies on" the new rule	Walker's claim actually relies on nonretroactive statutory/interpretive changes (e.g., Mathis) not Johnson	Court: movant must show by a preponderance that the sentencing court relied on the residual clause; remand for district court factfinding
Proper standard for establishing reliance on the residual clause in a silent sentencing record	(implicit) any reasonable possibility the court relied on the residual clause suffices	Require movant to prove it is more likely than not the residual clause was the basis	Court adopts the latter: movant bears preponderance burden; mere possibility insufficient
Who decides whether the residual clause was the basis for enhancement	Walker: district court should presume reliance when record is silent and contemporaneous precedent used residual clause	Government: movant must show reliance; district court resolves facts	Court: district court must determine facts and may consider background legal environment at sentencing; remand for factfinding
Whether remand is required here for merits	Walker contends relief warranted given contemporaneous Eighth Circuit decisions using the residual clause	Government argues Walker cannot show reliance and thus claim fails	Court: vacates denial and remands for district court to apply preponderance standard; merits only if Walker carries burden

Key Cases Cited

United States v. Naylor, 887 F.3d 397 (8th Cir. 2018) (en banc) (Eighth Circuit held Missouri burglary is broader than generic burglary)
United States v. Geozos, 870 F.3d 890 (9th Cir. 2017) (held a silent sentencing record may suffice to show reliance on residual clause)
United States v. Winston, 850 F.3d 677 (4th Cir. 2017) (similar rule to Geozos; relief when sentence may have relied on residual clause)
United States v. Washington, 890 F.3d 891 (10th Cir. 2018) (requires movant to prove by preponderance that residual clause was basis)
Dimott v. United States, 881 F.3d 232 (1st Cir. 2018) (same preponderance standard)
Beeman v. United States, 871 F.3d 1215 (11th Cir. 2017) (movant bears burden; mere possibility insufficient)
Kress v. United States, 411 F.2d 16 (8th Cir. 1969) (movant bears burden to show entitlement to § 2255 relief)
United States v. Nolan, 397 F.3d 665 (8th Cir. 2005) (Eighth Circuit precedent treating burglary as an ACCA predicate pre‑Johnson)
United States v. Blahowski, 324 F.3d 592 (8th Cir. 2003) (upheld burglary as a crime of violence using the residual clause)
United States v. Cantrell, 530 F.3d 684 (8th Cir. 2008) (applied residual‑clause reasoning in assessing Missouri burglary)
United States v. Taylor, 873 F.3d 476 (5th Cir. 2017) (background precedent can establish enhancement necessarily rested on residual clause)