Dansby, Michael Edward Sr.
2013 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 744
Tex. Crim. App.2013Background
- Dansby pled guilty to indecency with a child and received five years of deferred adjudication community supervision with a sex-offender treatment program and discretionary polygraph requirements.
- Appellant attended approximately fifty group therapy sessions and two maintenance polygraphs before being required to submit to a sexual history polygraph.
- During the April 6, 2009 sexual history polygraph, Dansby invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege and refused to answer incriminating questions; the polygraph interview was terminated.
- On August 18, 2009 Dansby was discharged from the sex-offender treatment program; the State moved to revoke community supervision alleging (30) refusal to submit to the sexual history polygraph and (36) failure to complete the treatment program.
- At the revocation hearing, the therapist testified that discharge was based on multiple factors, including non-disclosure and lack of engagement, with the polygraph being a critical component but not the sole reason.
- The trial court found violations of both conditions and adjudicated Dansby guilty, sentencing him to 18 years; the Dallas Court of Appeals upheld one ground (condition 36) and avoided the Fifth Amendment issue, prompting the Supreme Court to grant discretionary review.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether revoking probation for invoking the Fifth Amendment violates the Fifth Amendment. | Dansby argues discharge based on refusal to answer incriminating polygraph questions imposes punishment for Fifth Amendment exercise. | State contends discharge could be based on multiple factors, not solely the Fifth Amendment invocation. | Court holds revocation based on Fifth Amendment invocation is unconstitutional and remands for further consideration. |
| Whether there is an independent, constitutionally untainted basis for revoking supervision apart from the Fifth Amendment issue. | State contends discharge from treatment provides an independent basis for revocation. | State cannot rely on discharge that is infected by Fifth Amendment concerns when proving independent grounds. | Court finds the record does not establish an independent basis free of constitutional taint; remand to address Fifth Amendment claim. |
| Whether the appellate court properly addressed the constitutional issue given the record on discharge reasons. | State argues the court could affirm on condition 36 without reaching the Fifth Amendment issue. | Dansby asserts the appellate court erred by not addressing the Fifth Amendment issue. | Court reverses and remands to address the Fifth Amendment issue. |
Key Cases Cited
- Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420 (U.S. 1984) (probation supervision and Fifth Amendment immunity from self-incrimination in revocation proceedings)
- Chapman v. State, 115 S.W.3d 1 (Tex.Crim.App.2003) (probation revocation standards and admissibility of self-incrimination considerations)
- Cardona v. State, 665 S.W.2d 492 (Tex.Crim.App.1984) ( Fifth Amendment considerations in probation/revocation context)
- Murphy, 465 U.S. 420 (U.S. 1984) (cited for the rule that probation cannot be revoked for exercising Fifth Amendment rights without immunity)
- Dangelo, 376 S.W.3d 776 (Tex.Crim.App.2012) (concurring discussion on Fifth Amendment applicability in probation context)