Daniels v. District of Columbia
894 F. Supp. 2d 61
D.D.C.2012Background
- Daniels and her minor son M.C. sue the District of Columbia and officers Napper, Alvarenga, and Salice for arresting Daniels and detaining M.C. on May 18, 2010.
- Daniels was six months pregnant at the time and alleges officers used excessive force during removal from their building.
- Napper allegedly chased M.C., handcuffed him, and transported Daniels to a precinct with an “intentionally violent ride.”
- Alvarenga and Salice allegedly “manhandled” Daniels, pushing and jerking her during egress from the building.
- Plaintiffs assert common law assault, battery, IIED, and § 1983 claims; District is also sued via respondeat superior; Defendants move to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6).
- Court has subject-matter jurisdiction and denied in part, granted in part the motion to dismiss.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Validity of M.C.'s assault/battery and §1983 claims against Alvarenga and Salice | M.C. was subjected to improper contact by Alvarenga/Salice | M.C. contact, if any, was part of a Terry stop/arrest justified by flight from officer | M.C.'s claims against Alvarenga/Salice survive |
| M.C.'s assault/battery claim against Napper | Napper's conduct constitutes unjustified assault/battery | Napper's actions were justified as a Terry stop/arrest | Napper's assault claim against M.C. survives; record supports potential unjustified Terry stop. |
| Daniels' IIED claim against Alvarenga/Salice; M.C.'s IIED claims | Daniels suffered extreme distress from officers' conduct; M.C.'s distress insufficiently pleaded | IIED not supported for M.C.; Daniels' conduct not outrageous enough | Daniels' IIED claim against Alvarenga/Salice survives; M.C.'s IIED claim dismissed |
| Daniels' Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress claim | Negligence theory separate from use of excessive force, or accommodations post-arrest | NIED cannot be stated where only intentional torts alleged; no distinct negligence theory | NIED claim against all defendants dismissed |
| §12-309 notice and punitive damages | Notice satisfied via written letter or police report; punitive damages sought against DC and officers | Notice incomplete; DC immune from punitive damages; lack of state-of-mind for officers | DC punitive damages dismissed; M.C. punitive damages against Alvarenga/Salice dismissed; Daniels' punitive damages survive; §12-309 notice denied without prejudice to discovery. |
Key Cases Cited
- Chinn v. District of Columbia, 839 A.2d 701 (D.C. 2003) (negligence, evidencing need for distinct standard of care in police use of force)
- Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (Supreme Court 2000) (flight alone not per se indication of wrongdoing; not necessarily justifies Terry stop)
- Goddard, 491 F.3d 457 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (minimal objective justification for Terry stop)
- Castellon v. United States, 864 A.2d 141 (D.C. 2004) (distinguishing Terry stop from arrest factors such as detent. length and handcuffs)
- Romer v. District of Columbia, 449 A.2d 1097 (D.C. 1982) (notice purposes under §12-309; reasonableness of notice requirement)