Daniel Campbell v. City of Los Angeles, 903 F.3d 1090

Background

Two related FLSA collective actions (Alaniz and Mata) brought by LAPD officers alleged an unwritten, Department‑wide policy discouraging reporting of short overtime, leading ~2,500 opt‑in plaintiffs.
The City moved to decertify post‑discovery, arguing any unpaid overtime resulted from supervisor/worksite‑specific misconduct rather than a single Department policy.
The officers submitted hundreds of largely similar declarations alleging routine short, unreported overtime and a workplace culture discouraging reporting; the City produced extensive payroll/overtime data and evidence of a written, widely disseminated overtime reporting policy.
The district court applied a common three‑prong “ad hoc” decertification test, weighed the evidence, granted decertification, and dismissed opt‑in plaintiffs without prejudice; original plaintiffs later settled and final judgment entered.
The Ninth Circuit considered (1) whether opt‑in plaintiffs may appeal decertification after dismissal without prejudice and merger into final judgment, and (2) whether decertification was proper under the FLSA’s "similarly situated" requirement given the record.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Can opt‑in plaintiffs appeal a decertification order after they were dismissed without prejudice and a final judgment later entered?	Opt‑in plaintiffs are party plaintiffs under §216(b) and were parties when dismissed; the decertification order merged into final judgment, so they may appeal.	Decertification was interlocutory; dismissed opt‑ins lack party status at final judgment and thus lack standing to appeal; dismissal without prejudice is not appealable.	Court held opt‑ins have party status under the FLSA, the interlocutory order merged into final judgment, and opt‑ins may appeal.
What is the proper meaning of "similarly situated" under §216(b)?	Officers: similarity exists if plaintiffs share a material common issue (here, whether an unwritten Department‑wide policy discouraged reporting), which permits collective treatment despite differences in tasks/divisions.	City: plaintiffs are heterogeneous across ranks, divisions, supervisors and lack evidence of a systemic policy; similarities insufficient.	Court held §216(b) requires similarity as to a material legal/factual issue that advances collective resolution; collective treatment is appropriate where plaintiffs share a material common issue.
What standard should govern post‑discovery decertification motions that overlap with the merits?	Plaintiffs: where decertification overlaps the merits, apply summary judgment standards so factual disputes go to the factfinder.	City: courts may apply a stricter or preponderance standard and may weigh evidence at decertification.	Court held a post‑discovery decertification that overlaps the merits should be evaluated under the summary‑judgment standard; courts must not weigh evidence but ask whether a genuine dispute of material fact exists.
Was decertification warranted on the record here?	Officers: their substantial, similar declarations and evidence of a reporting culture create a triable issue as to a Department‑wide unwritten policy.	City: overwhelming evidence of compliance (millions of overtime reports including many short claims), written policies widely disseminated, and lack of evidence showing a top‑down policy mean no triable issue of systemic policy.	Court affirmed decertification: as a matter of law the record lacks substantial evidence of a Department‑wide tacit policy, so no genuine dispute exists warranting collective treatment.

Key Cases Cited

Hoffmann‑La Roche Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165 (Sup. Ct. 1989) (describes FLSA collective notice purpose and limits of court gatekeeping).
Symczyk v. Genesis HealthCare Corp., 569 U.S. 66 (Sup. Ct. 2013) (preliminary certification/notice does not create an independent class status).
Wal‑Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (Sup. Ct. 2011) (Rule 23 commonality requires common answers that drive litigation; court cautions against importing Rule 23 rigor to §216(b)).
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (Sup. Ct. 1986) (summary judgment standard and evaluation of genuine issues of material fact).
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (Sup. Ct. 1986) (summary judgment burden‑shifting principles).
Ray Haluch Gravel Co. v. Central Pension Fund, 571 U.S. 177 (Sup. Ct. 2014) (interlocutory orders re collective actions and appealability context).
Mickles v. Country Club, 887 F.3d 1270 (11th Cir. 2018) (opt‑in plaintiffs have party status and may appeal denial of collective treatment after final judgment).
Halle v. West Penn Allegheny Health Sys., 842 F.3d 215 (3d Cir. 2016) (contrasting holding on who may appeal after decertification; discussed and rejected as persuasive here).
Zavala v. Wal‑Mart Stores, 691 F.3d 527 (3d Cir. 2012) (advocates preponderance standard for decertification; court here rejects that standard where decertification overlaps merits).
Thiessen v. General Elec. Capital Corp., 267 F.3d 1095 (10th Cir. 2001) (describes the common ad‑hoc decertification test).