182 A.3d 1137
R.I.2018Background
- In April 2010 Dana Gallop, then a pretrial detainee at Adult Correctional Institutions (ACI), was assaulted by another inmate; Gallop sued correctional officers and others in negligence.
- Gallop was convicted on May 12, 2010 of multiple crimes and his convictions were affirmed; final judgment entered May 2, 2014, and he is serving life sentences.
- Rhode Island’s civil-death statute, G.L. 1956 § 13-6-1, provides that persons imprisoned for life are "deemed to be dead in all respects" with respect to all civil rights and relations.
- On the eve of trial in 2016, the trial justice raised § 13-6-1 sua sponte; defendants moved to dismiss and the court dismissed the complaint as plaintiff was civilly dead.
- Gallop sought leave to file a second amended complaint adding 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and other civil-rights claims; the trial justice did not rule on that motion before dismissing the case.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does § 13-6-1 bar Gallop’s civil suit after his life-sentence conviction became final? | § 13-6-1 should not defeat his pending suit; Vaccaro means the proviso triggers only after final conviction and his suit was filed earlier. | Once Gallop’s conviction became final, § 13-6-1 extinguished his civil rights and bars his suit. | The statute is clear and applies: after final conviction Gallop is deemed civilly dead and cannot pursue the civil action. |
| Is dismissal on § 13-6-1 a subject-matter jurisdictional defect? | Court lacked authority to apply civil-death to bar a § 1983 action; § 1983 preempts state rules that deny access to remedies. | The Superior Court has subject-matter jurisdiction, but § 13-6-1 removes the plaintiff’s authority to proceed; dismissal for lack of authority was proper. | Superior Court had subject-matter jurisdiction generally, but § 13-6-1 divested Gallop of the right to proceed; dismissal was proper (an excess-of-authority/mandated bar, not a structural lack of jurisdiction). |
| Does 42 U.S.C. § 1983 prevent application of § 13-6-1 to bar federal civil-rights claims in state court? | § 1983’s reference to "other proper proceeding for redress" requires courts to hear federal-rights claims; state law cannot bar access. | No controlling authority requires a state court to hear a § 1983 claim filed by a person civilly dead under state statute. | Court rejected Gallop’s unsupported assertion; it found no authority that § 1983 compels a state court to ignore § 13-6-1. |
| Should the trial justice have ruled on Gallop’s motion to file a second amended complaint? | The trial justice failed to exercise discretion and must decide the motion; Gallop sought to add § 1983 claims. | The amendment was untimely and would prejudice defendants; trial preparation and statutes of limitations counsel against late amendment. | The trial justice erred by not ruling on the motion; the case is remanded for a reasoned decision on the motion (the Court takes no position on the merits). |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Gallop, 89 A.3d 795 (R.I. 2014) (appellate affirmance of Gallop’s criminal convictions)
- Bogosian v. Vaccaro, 422 A.2d 1253 (R.I. 1980) (civil-death proviso triggers only after final judgment of conviction)
- Boyer v. Bedrosian, 57 A.3d 259 (R.I. 2012) (Rule 12(b)(1) and de novo review of jurisdictional fact questions)
- State v. Hazard, 68 A.3d 479 (R.I. 2013) (statutory interpretation reviewed de novo)
- Hartt v. Hartt, 397 A.2d 518 (R.I. 1979) (distinguishing subject-matter jurisdiction from excess-of-jurisdiction errors)
- Chase v. Bouchard, 671 A.2d 794 (R.I. 1996) (Superior Court is a court of general jurisdiction; failure of condition precedent is not jurisdictional)
- Faerber v. Cavanagh, 568 A.2d 326 (R.I. 1990) (undue prejudice from late amendment close to trial)
- DeSantis v. Prelle, 891 A.2d 873 (R.I. 2006) (statute-of-limitations bar to adding new parties after limitations period)