Damien Freeman v. Lyneal Wainwright, 959 F.3d 226

In 2001 Damien Freeman pleaded guilty to felony murder in Ohio and was sentenced to 15 years-to-life plus post-release control; he did not appeal and the sentence became final in January 2002.
In 2015 Freeman sought post-conviction relief, arguing post-release control was improper for felony murder; the Ohio Court of Appeals agreed the post-release-control portion was improper and remanded for a nunc pro tunc entry deleting only that portion.
In January 2017 the trial court vacated and replaced the original sentencing journal entry nunc pro tunc, striking the single sentence imposing post-release control (no resentencing hearing was held).
Freeman filed a federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in June 2017; the district court dismissed it as untimely under AEDPA § 2244(d)(1)(A) but granted a COA on whether the 2017 order created a new “judgment.”
The Sixth Circuit majority affirmed dismissal, holding the limited, favorable modification did not constitute a new judgment that would restart the AEDPA one-year clock; a dissent argued Supreme Court precedent requires treating any resentencing as a new judgment.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the 2017 nunc pro tunc deletion of post-release control created a new "judgment" under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A)	Freeman: Yes — the amended entry is a new judgment and restarts the AEDPA limitations period	State: No — it was a limited clerical/judicial correction that benefited Freeman and did not disturb the original final judgment	Court: No — the modification was a limited, beneficial change and did not create a new judgment; petition is time-barred
Whether limited resentencings that benefit the prisoner restart AEDPA's clock	Freeman: Any substantive resentencing (even favorable) creates a new judgment	State: Only full resentencings or limited resentencings that make the defendant worse restart the clock	Court: Following Crangle, only new, worse-than-before sentences create new judgments; beneficial limited resentencings do not
Precedential effect and consistency with Supreme Court precedent	Freeman: Crangle's better/worse distinction is dicta and conflicts with Burton and Magwood; Supreme Court treats resentencings as new judgments regardless	State: Crangle is binding circuit precedent and Burton/Magwood involved full resentencings and are distinguishable	Court: Crangle is binding; Burton and Magwood are distinguishable as involving full resentencings; affirm dismissal

Burton v. Stewart, 549 U.S. 147 (2007) (Supreme Court treating amended sentence as a new judgment for AEDPA purposes in the context of resentencing)
Crangle v. Kelly, 838 F.3d 673 (6th Cir. 2016) (held a new, worse-than-before sentence restarts AEDPA clock; limited beneficial resentencings do not)
King v. Morgan, 807 F.3d 154 (6th Cir. 2015) (full resentencing produces a new judgment that restarts AEDPA clock)
Magwood v. Patterson, 561 U.S. 320 (2010) (full resentencing treated as a new judgment for habeas purposes)
Eberle v. Warden, Mansfield Corr. Inst., [citation="532 F. App'x 605"] (6th Cir. 2013) (nunc pro tunc deletion of post-release control without a new sentencing entry did not create a new judgment)