Damian Scott v. State
01-15-00054-CR
Tex. App.Jun 16, 2015Background
- On Dec. 1, 2013 HPD Officers Brewster and Rothberg stopped Damian Scott, who was riding a bicycle at night, citing traffic violations; officers used marked patrol car lights and a spotlight and told him to stop.
- Officers asked Scott to identify himself and, according to Brewster, asked whether he had a crack pipe; Brewster testified Scott replied he had a crack pipe in his front jacket pocket.
- Brewster said that reply gave probable cause to search; officers recovered a crack pipe and, while handcuffing Scott, discovered a pistol; Scott then fled.
- Scott testified he refused consent to search and that officers searched him anyway; the record contains no Miranda warnings or recording of any custodial statement.
- At trial the court denied Scott’s pretrial motion to suppress detention, arrest, and fruits of the search; Scott pleaded guilty at bench trial and received concurrent prison terms; he appealed arguing ineffective assistance for failure to move to suppress the incriminating statement.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Scott) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held (trial court / posture) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the bicycle stop and officer's conduct constituted a custodial detention requiring Miranda warnings before asking about contraband | The stop involved a show of authority (lights, spotlight, blocking) so a reasonable person would not feel free to leave; asking whether he had a crack pipe began a custodial interrogation | Officers treated it as an investigative stop and asked routine ID/questions; no Miranda required for noncustodial encounters | Trial court denied suppression of the detention/arrest/search (motion denied); appellant preserved this as appellate issue |
| Whether Scott’s alleged oral admission (“I have a crack pipe”) was admissible under Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 38.22 §3 | The statement was the product of custodial interrogation and, because no Miranda warnings or recording were given, the statement is inadmissible under art. 38.22 §3 | The State relies on the officers’ testimony that Scott volunteered the information and that art. 14.3(a)(6) allows arrest based on such statement | Trial court admitted the statement (denied suppression); appellant argues it should have been suppressed |
| Whether art. 14.3(a)(6) authorized a warrantless arrest based on Scott’s oral statement absent Miranda compliance | Scott: even if the statement would supply probable cause under art. 14.3(a)(6), art. 38.22 §3 bars admission of custodial oral statements not given after warnings/recording, so arrest based on that statement was improper | State: arrest was lawful because the statement (as testified) provided probable cause to arrest for possession | Trial court treated arrest/search as lawful; appellant now contends the statutory interplay required suppression |
| Whether trial counsel was ineffective for failing to move to suppress the oral statement and its fruits | Scott: failure to move to suppress was objectively unreasonable (no conceivable strategy) and prejudiced him because the statement led to seizure of contraband and gun; but for counsel’s failure suppression would have been granted or error preserved | State: (implicit) counsel’s choices were reasonable; record lacks demonstration of deficient performance or prejudice | Posture on appeal: appellant argues Strickland prejudice; trial court record preserved claim for appellate review |
Key Cases Cited
- Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (custodial interrogation requires warnings before admissible statements)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two‑prong test for ineffective assistance: deficient performance and prejudice)
- Johnson v. State, 414 S.W.3d 184 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (factors showing an investigative detention when officer blocks egress, uses spotlight, authoritative questioning)
- Kerwick v. State, 393 S.W.3d 270 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (bifurcated review of suppression rulings; historical facts deferred to trial court, legal reasonableness reviewed de novo)
- Ortiz v. State, 382 S.W.3d 367 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (custody analysis not limited to enumerated categories; Miranda protections apply when custodial interrogation occurs)
- Kothe v. State, 152 S.W.3d 54 (Tex. Crim. App.) (framework for reviewing search/seizure reasonableness under Fourth Amendment)
- Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (distinguishing casual encounters from investigatory stops)
- Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977) (reasonableness balancing in traffic stop context)
- Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33 (1996) (reasonableness tested by totality of circumstances)
- State v. Castleberry, 332 S.W.3d 460 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (probable cause requirement for investigative detentions)
