Dallas Symphony Association, Inc. A/K/A Dallas Symphony Orchestra v. Jose Reyes
571 S.W.3d 753
Tex.2019Background
- Jose Reyes, a long-time volunteer and small donor at the Dallas Symphony Orchestra, was asked to stop volunteering after complaints about him crashing events and misrepresenting his role; the Orchestra informed its Bank contact that Reyes was no longer welcome.
- Reyes sent a confrontational email to the Orchestra CEO from his Bank email; the Bank placed him on administrative leave and later terminated him citing policy violations.
- The Orchestra issued a media advisory announcing Reyes was no longer affiliated with it; D Magazine investigated and published an article critical of Reyes.
- Reyes sued D Magazine and the Orchestra alleging defamation (per se and per quod), conspiracy to defame, negligence/gross negligence, and tortious interference with employment, among other claims.
- D Magazine and the Orchestra filed consolidated summary judgment motions arguing First Amendment/libel defenses; the trial court granted some claims but denied others; both defendants appealed under Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 51.014(a)(6).
- The Texas Supreme Court addressed (1) whether § 51.014(a)(6) permits interlocutory appeals of an order denying a motion for summary judgment in part on free-speech/libel grounds and in part on noncovered grounds, (2) whether the Orchestra tortiously interfered with Reyes’ employment, and (3) whether the D Magazine article was defamatory.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Scope of interlocutory appeal under Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 51.014(a)(6) | Reyes: appealable only as to constitutional/libel grounds; noncovered claims not appealable. | Orchestra: statute permits appeal of the entire order denying a motion based in whole or in part on covered defenses. | Court: § 51.014(a)(6) authorizes appeal of the whole interlocutory order denying a single motion that was based in whole or in part on covered free-speech/libel defenses. |
| Tortious interference (Orchestra) — entitlement to summary judgment | Reyes: Orchestra’s communications to the Bank caused his termination; factual disputes exist. | Orchestra: it only truthfully stated Reyes was disassociated and relayed his email; no willful, intentional interference evidence. | Court: no evidence of willful, intentional interference; Orchestra entitled to summary judgment on tortious interference. |
| Defamation claims against D Magazine — falsity/defamatory meaning | Reyes: the article’s gist and aggregate statements portrayed him as deceitful/fraudulent and damaged reputation. | D Magazine: challenged statements are true, nonactionable opinion, hyperbole, or nonverifiable; not defamatory. | Court: agreed with court of appeals — challenged statements are true or nonactionable; no defamatory statements; summary judgment for D Magazine affirmed. |
| Conspiracy & negligence claims (derivative) | Reyes: conspiracy and negligence are independent torts arising from defendants’ conduct. | Defendants: conspiracy depends on an underlying tort (defamation/tortious interference); negligence claims are restatements of defamation. | Court: without viable defamation or tortious interference, conspiracy fails; negligence/gross negligence are not independent claims here — summary judgment affirmed. |
Key Cases Cited
- Bally Total Fitness Corp. v. Jackson, 53 S.W.3d 352 (Tex. 2001) (discussing construction and limits of interlocutory appeal statute)
- Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Rincones, 520 S.W.3d 572 (Tex. 2017) (no tortious interference where party merely reported facts to employer)
- Neely v. Wilson, 418 S.W.3d 52 (Tex. 2013) (statements not verifiable as false cannot support defamation)
- Prudential Ins. Co. of Am. v. Financial Review Servs., Inc., 29 S.W.3d 74 (Tex. 2000) (elements of tortious interference with existing contract)
- Tilton v. Marshall, 925 S.W.2d 672 (Tex. 1996) (defendant’s liability for conspiracy depends on participation in an underlying tort)