344 Conn. 464
Conn.2022Background
- On June 1, 2013, Daley rode a non-street-legal yellow motorcycle with a group of dirt bikes/quads in Hartford; Officer Kashmanian followed them in an unmarked “soft car” after a tip.
- While surveilling, Kashmanian drove ~40–50 mph in a 25 mph zone, sideswiped another car, crossed the center line into the opposite lane, and struck the rear tire of Daley’s motorcycle, causing serious injuries.
- A jury returned a verdict for Daley on negligence; the trial court reserved the immunity defense, later set aside the verdict, and held that discretionary-act governmental immunity barred liability.
- The Appellate Court affirmed that surveillance (including how an officer drives) is discretionary and immune under common law and §52-557n(a)(2)(B).
- The Supreme Court reversed that part of the Appellate Court decision: it held the statutory rules of the road impose ministerial duties on officers (outside narrow §14-283 emergency privileges), so Kashmanian’s manner of driving was not protected by discretionary-act immunity; the city’s indemnification claim (§7-465) must be reinstated.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether an officer’s manner of driving during on-duty surveillance is a discretionary act (immunity) or a ministerial duty | Daley: the motor-vehicle statutes (e.g., §§14-230, 14-218a, 14-240) create mandatory rules of the road; Kashmanian violated ministerial duties, so no immunity | Defs: surveillance is a typical discretionary police function; manner/speed/distance decisions are judgment calls and fall within §52-557n immunity | Held: manner of driving is ministerial under the motor-vehicle statutes (absent narrow §14-283 emergency privileges); discretionary immunity does not apply to the negligent operation here |
| Whether §52-557n or its legislative history shelters vehicular negligence by municipalities | Daley: legislative history and precedent show the legislature did not intend to shield vehicular negligence; §52-557n should not abrogate existing liability for driving negligence | Defs: statutory silence and some “reasonable” statutory language support treating driving decisions as discretionary | Held: §52-557n is ambiguous on driving; extratextual sources (legislative history, case law like Tetro) show the legislature did not intend blanket immunity for vehicular negligence; driving is treated as ministerial |
| Whether the city must indemnify the officer under §7-465 if the officer is negligent | Daley: if officer is negligent (not immune), municipality must indemnify under §7-465 | Defs: indemnification fails if officer’s conduct is immune | Held: because officer’s driving was ministerial and not immune, the city is liable to indemnify — jury verdict and indemnification claim must be reinstated |
Key Cases Cited
- Cole v. New Haven, 337 Conn. 326 (2020) (discusses scope of discretionary immunity for police conduct and limits on treating all emergency police conduct as discretionary)
- Borelli v. Renaldi, 336 Conn. 1 (2020) (analyzes §14-283 and discretionary duties in pursuit contexts; leaves some emergency-driving issues open)
- Tetro v. Stratford, 189 Conn. 601 (1983) (rejects blanket immunity for high-speed police pursuits; indicates municipalities can be liable for vehicular negligence)
- Grady v. Somers, 294 Conn. 324 (2009) (considers legislative intent and relationship between §52-557n and common-law exceptions)
- Northrup v. Witkowski, 332 Conn. 158 (2019) (explains that mandatory statutory language can convert duties into ministerial acts for immunity analysis)