339 A.3d 175
D.C.2025Background
- D.W. was convicted of several firearm offenses after police at the Geraldine Apartment Complex saw him flee at the mere sight of officers and later apprehended him with a firearm.
- The Geraldine Apartment Complex is considered by police to be a high-crime area due to repeated violent incidents, although officers could not provide concrete crime statistics.
- D.W. moved to suppress the firearm evidence, arguing the stop and seizure were unconstitutional.
- The trial court denied the motion, finding that D.W.’s unprovoked flight in a high-crime area gave police reasonable suspicion for the stop.
- The case's appeal was stayed pending an en banc decision in Mayo v. United States, which clarified legal standards for Terry stops based on flight and area crime reputation.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether police had reasonable suspicion to stop D.W. after unprovoked flight in a high-crime area | Flight and generic high-crime designation are not enough for reasonable suspicion | Police argued flight in a high-crime area justified stop | Court held that neither factor alone or together sufficed; suppression granted |
| Weight to be given to 'high-crime area' designations in reasonable suspicion analysis | Label is too vague without specific evidence | Reputation and officer testimony suffices | Courts must require specific, recent, and geographically precise data |
| Whether unprovoked flight alone is inherently suspicious | Flight can be innocent response, especially in over-policed areas | Headlong flight at sight of police implies guilt | Flight alone, without more, does not justify stop |
| Applicability of Supreme Court precedent (Wardlow) | Wardlow does not require finding stop reasonable on flight/high-crime area alone | Wardlow supports our position | Wardlow factually distinguishable, does not govern outcome here |
Key Cases Cited
- Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000) (flight in a high-crime area as a factor for Terry stops)
- United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1 (1989) (reasonable suspicion standard for investigative stops)
- Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (establishing the Terry stop standard)
- United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266 (2002) (totality of the circumstances control reasonable suspicion)
- District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48 (2018) (probable cause and reasonable suspicion are fluid concepts)
- Mayo v. United States, 315 A.3d 606 (D.C. 2024) (en banc) (limitations on flight/high-crime area as sole Terry stop justification)
- Posey v. United States, 201 A.3d 1198 (D.C. 2019) (flight alone isn't sufficient for reasonable suspicion)