D.W. v. United States (en banc), 19-CF-0143

D.W. was outside the Geraldine apartment complex when officers on routine patrol approached, and he ran as they stepped onto the walkway. 1
After a brief chase through the complex and nearby yards, Officer Ewing grabbed D.W.'s leg as D.W. tried to scale a second fence, and D.W. dropped a gun. 2
The trial court denied D.W.'s suppression motion, finding reasonable articulable suspicion based on his immediate flight, the length and desperation of the chase, and crime testimony about the Geraldine. 3
A prior division of the court vacated D.W.'s convictions for lack of reasonable suspicion, but the en banc court granted rehearing and vacated that opinion. 4
The en banc majority held the officers had reasonable articulable suspicion because D.W. fled upon seeing officers from a distance, had not been singled out, and fled desperately through fences in a complex with some evidence of persistent violent crime. 5
The court reaffirmed Mayo but distinguished it and limited Posey, while one judge concurred only in the judgment and one dissented. 6

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Reasonable suspicion for seizure 7	D.W. lacked reasonable suspicion; his flight was innocuous and police knew the complex was heavily policed.	The United States argued D.W.'s headlong flight, crime evidence, and desperate fence-climbing justified the stop.	The court held the seizure was supported by reasonable articulable suspicion. 8
Effect of Mayo 9	D.W. argued Mayo required reversal because unprovoked flight plus generic high-crime evidence is insufficient.	The United States argued Mayo was distinguishable because D.W. was not targeted and fled before police focused on him.	The court distinguished Mayo and held D.W.'s flight was more incriminating in context. 10
Effect of Posey 11	D.W. relied on Posey to argue unprovoked flight alone cannot justify a stop.	The United States argued Posey did not control because the surrounding facts here were stronger.	The court limited Posey and held its broad reading could not defeat the stop here. 12

Mayo v. United States, 315 A.3d 606 (D.C. 2024) (flight and locational crime evidence must be assessed in context under the totality of circumstances 13)
Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (U.S. 2000) (headlong flight upon noticing police can be suggestive of wrongdoing 14)
District of Columbia v. R.W., 146 S. Ct. 1069 (U.S. 2026) (Fourth Amendment analysis must consider the whole picture, not divide and conquer factors 15)
Posey v. United States, 201 A.3d 1198 (D.C. 2019) (unprovoked flight by a nondescript person from a nondescript crowd does not alone justify a stop 16)
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (U.S. 1968) (reasonable suspicion requires specific, articulable facts and governs investigative stops 17)
Kansas v. Glover, 589 U.S. 376 (U.S. 2020) (reasonable suspicion requires less than proof by a preponderance of the evidence 18)
District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48 (U.S. 2018) (courts must view circumstances as a whole in probable cause and similar Fourth Amendment inquiries 19)