25-1314
1st Cir.Jul 14, 2026Background
- Czerno sued GE in Massachusetts state court alleging PCB exposure from GE's Pittsfield plant caused her son C.L.'s leukemia. 1
- GE had long manufactured PCB-containing electrical equipment at Pittsfield and, during World War II, produced specialized PCB-infused products for the federal government. 2
- GE also allegedly dumped PCBs near Allendale Elementary School and later provided contaminated soil for the school grounds. 3
- After PCB regulation and cleanup efforts, GE entered a 2000 consent decree to remediate Hill 78, Allendale Elementary, and other sites. 4
- GE removed the action under the federal officer removal statute, but the district court remanded after finding § 1442(a)(1) unmet. 5
- The First Circuit reverses, holding GE satisfied the 'acting under' and 'for or relating to' requirements and remanding only for the colorable federal defense inquiry. 6
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Did GE 'act under' a federal officer? 7 | GE was just a contractor and disposal was not directed by the government. | GE made specialized PCB products at the military's request for war needs. | Yes; GE acted under federal officers. 8 |
| Do Czerno's claims 'relate to' GE's federal work? 9 | Her claims target disposal, which the government never authorized. | Her claims concern GE's manufacture and use of PCB products for the government. | Yes; multiple claims satisfy the nexus requirement. 10 |
| Did the district court apply too strict a removal standard? 11 | Federal contractor removal needs tight government control and specific direction. | The statute is broad and does not require such tight control. | Yes; the district court overread the statute. 12 |
| Has GE shown a colorable federal defense? 13 | No federal defense was established below. | GE argued a federal defense on appeal. | Not decided; remanded for the district court to consider first. 14 |
Key Cases Cited
- Willingham v. Morgan, 395 U.S. 402 (U.S. 1969) (federal officer removal is an absolute right when the statute applies 15)
- Watson v. Philip Morris Cos., 551 U.S. 142 (U.S. 2007) (defines 'acting under' and rejects mere regulatory compliance 16)
- Mesa v. California, 489 U.S. 121 (U.S. 1989) (federal officer removal requires a colorable federal defense 17)
- Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Plaquemines Parish, La., 146 S. Ct. 1052 (U.S. 2026) ('acting under' and 'relating to' are distinct and the nexus requirement is broad 18)
- Gov't of P.R. v. Express Scripts, Inc., 119 F.4th 174 (1st Cir. 2024) (removal elements are distinct; any single claim can satisfy the nexus requirement 19)
- Moore v. Electric Boat Corp., 25 F.4th 30 (1st Cir. 2022) (explains the acting-under and nexus requirements for federal officer removal 20)
- Rhode Island v. Shell Oil Prods. Co., 979 F.3d 50 (1st Cir. 2020) (discussed nexus limits in environmental-damage claims 21)
- Rhode Island v. Shell Oil Prods. Co., 35 F.4th 44 (1st Cir. 2022) (adhered to Shell Oil I's federal officer removal reasoning 22)
- Latiolais v. Huntington Ingalls, Inc., 951 F.3d 286 (5th Cir. 2020) (interprets the broadened 'relating to' language after the 2011 amendment 23)
- Genereux v. American Beryllia Corp., 577 F.3d 350 (1st Cir. 2009) (recognizes contractor-based federal officer removal for military hardware supplies 24)
- Sawyer v. Foster Wheeler LLC, 860 F.3d 249 (4th Cir. 2017) (government contractors assembling military equipment may act under federal officers 25)