Cyran v. Cyran (Slip Opinion), 152 Ohio St. 3d 484

Rebecca filed a domestic-violence civil protection order (CPO) against Curtis after an alleged June 17, 2015 incident; an ex parte order issued June 19, 2015 and, after a full hearing, a permanent CPO was entered that expired June 19, 2016.
Curtis timely objected in the trial court, which overruled objections and adopted the magistrate’s finding; Curtis appealed to the Second District.
While the appeal was pending the CPO expired; the appellate court ordered the parties to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed as moot.
Curtis argued the collateral-consequences exception to mootness should apply because the CPO could affect his concealed-firearm permit, credit, housing, employment, and future custody/shared-parenting proceedings; Rebecca did not seek extension of the order.
The Second District dismissed the appeal as moot, reasoning no Ohio law imposed legal consequences from an expired CPO; the Ohio Supreme Court affirmed, holding that absent demonstrated legal collateral consequences an appeal of an expired domestic-violence CPO is moot.
Justice Kennedy dissented, arguing that statutory directives (R.C. 3109.04) requiring courts to consider history/potential for domestic violence in shared-parenting decisions create probable legal collateral consequences, so the appeal should not be dismissed.

Issue	Curtis's Argument	Rebecca's/State's Argument	Held
Does the collateral-consequences exception to mootness apply to appeals of expired domestic-violence CPOs when possible consequences are not yet ascertainable?	The possibility of future collateral consequences (e.g., firearm permit, employment, housing, credit, custody) preserves the appeal; courts should follow Wilder’s “reasonable possibility” rule.	Absent demonstrated legal consequences imposed by law, mere possibility is speculative and insufficient to avoid mootness.	No — the exception requires demonstrated legal collateral consequences; speculation or unascertainable possibilities are insufficient.
Should there be a rebuttable presumption that appeals of expired domestic-violence CPOs are not moot?	A rebuttable presumption should protect respondents’ right to challenge findings that may affect future parenting rights.	No presumption exists in the statutory scheme; creating one is for the legislature.	No — the court declines to create such a presumption; statutory amendment would be required.

Fortner v. Thomas, 22 Ohio St.2d 13 (1970) (courts decide actual controversies capable of judicial relief)
Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969) (no decision where parties lack a legally cognizable interest)
State v. Golston, 71 Ohio St.3d 224 (1994) (collateral-consequences exception recognized for criminal convictions)
Cleveland Hts. v. Lewis, 129 Ohio St.3d 389 (2011) (collateral disabilities can preserve appeal of misdemeanor conviction)
Wilder v. Perna, 174 Ohio App.3d 586 (8th Dist. 2007) (appellate rule that reasonable possibility of collateral consequences defeats mootness — court declined to follow)
Putman v. Kennedy, 279 Conn. 162 (2006) (finding of domestic violence may have collateral effect on future custody proceedings)
In re A.G., 139 Ohio St.3d 572 (2014) (mootness doctrine principles)
Miner v. Witt, 82 Ohio St. 237 (1910) (courts should refrain from advisory opinions)
Smith v. Leis, 111 Ohio St.3d 493 (2006) (avoidance of advisory opinions reiterated)