951 F.3d 364
6th Cir.2020Background
- Cynthia Madej is severely disabled and diagnosed (by her treating physicians) with multiple chemical sensitivity (MCS), a condition not recognized by the AMA or WHO.
- The Madejs live ~280 feet from Dutch Creek Road; Athens County planned chip-seal (heated asphalt liquid + stone) maintenance to reduce dust.
- Madejs allege asphalt will trigger disabling reactions and requested a reasonable accommodation/modification (non-asphalt alternatives); county engineer proceeded with chip seal.
- Plaintiffs sued the county engineer in federal court under the Fair Housing Amendments Act (FHAA) and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) seeking alternatives and injunctive relief.
- The district court excluded the opinions of the three medical experts (two treating physicians and one retained expert) under Daubert/Rule 702 as unreliable (opinions based on subjective patient history, no objective testing, and an obsolete sublingual test) and granted summary judgment for the engineer for lack of admissible causation evidence.
- The Sixth Circuit affirmed: it concluded the statutory claims require a causation/necessity showing, the experts’ opinions were properly excluded under Rule 702, and summary judgment was therefore appropriate.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether FHAA/ADA claims require the kind of causation proof used in toxic-tort cases | Madej: Federal statutes do not import common-law toxic-tort general/specific causation tests | Maiden: Plaintiffs must show chip seal asphalt will cause Madej harm (necessity/but-for causation) | Court: Statutes still require a causation/necessity showing; focusing on causation was proper (plaintiffs conceded need for expert proof) |
| Whether experts’ opinions on MCS/asphalt causation were admissible under Rule 702/Daubert | Madej: Treating doctors and expert reliably opine that asphalt will harm Cynthia | Maiden: Experts’ methods are unreliable—largely subjective history, no objective testing, cannot rule out other causes | Court: Affirmed exclusion—opinions were not grounded in reliable, testable methodology; district court did not abuse discretion |
| Whether expert causation evidence was required to survive summary judgment | Madej: (conceded at argument they do not challenge need for expert causation testimony) | Maiden: Expert causation is required; absent it, summary judgment is proper | Court: Because experts were excluded and plaintiffs conceded necessity of expert causation, summary judgment affirmed |
| Whether FHAA/ADA cover county roadwork (statutory scope) | Madej: Roadwork/road services fall within FHAA/ADA reach and thus require accommodation/modification | Maiden: Roadwork may not be a “service in connection with” dwelling (FHAA) or a covered “service, program, or activity” (Title II) | Court: Raised serious doubts about statutory coverage but did not resolve them on appeal; assumed coverage for purposes of decision and focused on causation and admissibility issues |
Key Cases Cited
- Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., 509 U.S. 579 (1993) (establishes district-court gatekeeping for expert scientific testimony)
- Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999) (Daubert standard applies to all expert testimony; discretion in reliability inquiry)
- Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 559 U.S. 393 (2010) (federal rules may determine evidentiary/procedural questions before applying state law)
- Hollis v. Chestnut Bend Homeowners Ass'n, 760 F.3d 531 (6th Cir. 2014) (necessity element in FHAA requires causation tying accommodation to equal opportunity)
- Tamraz v. Lincoln Elec. Co., 620 F.3d 665 (6th Cir. 2010) (expert ipse dixit insufficient; court may exclude testimony lacking reliable methodology)
- Summers v. Missouri Pacific R.R. Sys., 132 F.3d 599 (10th Cir. 1997) (recognizes MCS as a controversial diagnosis often excluded under Daubert)