CVLR Performance Horses, Inc. v. Wynne
977 F. Supp. 2d 598
W.D. Va.2013Background
- CVLR Performance Horses (owned by Crystal Rivers) contracted to buy a riding center; Wynne represented he could finance the purchase through Rivermont but in fact arranged financing through Old Dominion and caused 1650 Partners (under his control) to be listed as purchaser.
- Rivers believed CVLR would acquire the property; a deed was prepared conveying the property to 1650 Partners and closing occurred in November 2007. Rivers was later a member of 1650 Partners and signed an Entity Authorization.
- Plaintiff sued Wynne, 1650 Partners, Rivermont and others asserting RICO, tortious interference with contract, and a business conspiracy under Va. Code § 18.2-499, among other claims.
- The Fourth Circuit previously reversed dismissal of the RICO claim and remanded; the parties renewed motions to dismiss and to amend the complaint.
- The district court must decide: (1) whether proposed amendments to the RICO claim are permissible; (2) whether the tortious interference claim survives dismissal given Rivers’ involvement with 1650 Partners; and (3) whether the business conspiracy claim pleads an unlawful act with sufficient particularity.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| RICO (Count I): whether amendment should be permitted | Proposed amendments refine allegations of the RICO enterprise and continuity | Amendments are redundant and excessive but no specific futility argument | Grant leave to amend; amendments not clearly frivolous or futile |
| Tortious interference (Count III): whether CVLR plausibly pleaded interference | CVLR alleges Wynne and 1650 induced breach by acquiring property and interfering before authorization | Wynne/1650 argue CVLR (via Rivers) authorized 1650 to buy, and one cannot interfere with one’s own contract or an agent with principal | Deny motion to dismiss as to Count III; pleadings suffice to proceed to discovery; leave to amend granted |
| Business conspiracy (Count IV): whether pleading alleges an unlawful act with particularity | Plaintiff broadened claim to allege fraud, false pretenses, forgery and an overarching scheme beyond mere breach | Defendants argue original claim alleged only breach of contract, which cannot support § 18.2‑499; amended allegations remain conclusory | Grant motion to dismiss Count IV for failure to plead unlawful act and required particularity; amendment as to this count denied as moot |
Key Cases Cited
- Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (plausibility standard for Rule 12(b)(6))
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (pleading must permit reasonable inference of liability)
- Nemet Chevrolet, Ltd. v. Consumeraffairs.com, Inc., 591 F.3d 250 (4th Cir. 2009) (accept well‑pleaded facts at 12(b)(6) stage)
- Chaves v. Johnson, 230 Va. 112 (Va. 1985) (elements of tortious interference)
- Fox v. Deese, 234 Va. 412 (Va. 1987) (one cannot intentionally interfere with one’s own contract)
- Hechler Chevrolet, Inc. v. General Motors Corp., 230 Va. 396 (Va. 1985) (conspiracy claim requires an unlawful act or purpose)
- Station #2, LLC v. Lynch, 280 Va. 166 (Va. 2010) (breach of contract alone cannot support civil conspiracy claim)
- Simmons v. Miller, 261 Va. 561 (Va. 2001) (elements and requirement of legal malice for § 18.2‑499 claims)