990 F.3d 272
2d Cir.2021Background
- Veronica Cuthill (LPR) filed an I-130 for her daughter Tatiana Diaz on Sept. 29, 2016; USCIS approved the petition 363 days later (Sept. 27, 2017).
- Diaz turned 21 on Dec. 23, 2017, but under the CSPA’s age‑reduction formula (subtracting processing time) she remained statutorily under 21 for 363 days after approval.
- Cuthill naturalized on June 25, 2018 while Diaz remained statutorily under 21; Cuthill sought conversion of the F2A petition to an immediate‑relative petition on July 13, 2018.
- The State Department refused conversion on the ground that Diaz’s biological age at naturalization exceeded 21 and instead transferred her to the F1 category.
- Cuthill sued; the district court granted summary judgment for Cuthill. The Second Circuit affirmed, interpreting 8 U.S.C. § 1151(f)(2) to incorporate the CSPA age‑reduction formula in § 1153(h)(1), and rejecting Chevron deference to the BIA/agency interpretation.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether “age” in 8 U.S.C. § 1151(f)(2) incorporates the CSPA § 1153(h)(1) age‑reduction (subtracting USCIS processing time) | "Age" means the CSPA statutory age (biological age minus processing time), so Diaz was under 21 at parent’s naturalization | "Age" means biological age on naturalization date; age‑reduction in § 1153(h)(1) does not apply | Court holds § 1151(f)(2) incorporates the basic CSPA age‑reduction formula; Diaz qualified as under 21 at naturalization and may convert to immediate‑relative |
| Remedy on conversion: convert F2A to immediate‑relative (no queue) or transfer to F1 (citizen adult category) | Conversion should result in immediate‑relative classification (best protects child) | Transfer to F1 is appropriate because Diaz was biologically over 21 | Court orders conversion to immediate‑relative category under § 1151(f)(2) as interpreted with the age‑reduction formula |
| Whether agency/BIA interpretation (Matter of Zamora‑Molina) merits Chevron deference | No — Congress’s intent is clear from text, structure, and legislative history | Yes — defer to agency interpretation embodied in BIA/State Department practice | Court declines Chevron deference, finds Congressional intent clear, and rejects agency interpretation |
Key Cases Cited
- Scialabba v. Cuellar de Osorio, 573 U.S. 41 (2014) (background on visa queues and CSPA’s age‑reduction distinction)
- King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473 (2015) (read statutes in context and against overall scheme)
- Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303 (2009) (meaning of words may depend on statutory context)
- Tovar v. Sessions, 882 F.3d 895 (9th Cir. 2018) (statutory interpretation of CSPA provisions)
- Guerrero‑Lasprilla v. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 1062 (2020) (legislative history and statutory purpose inform interpretation)
- Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (framework for agency deference; not applied where Congress’s intent is clear)