Curtis Wheat v. Fifth Third Bank
785 F.3d 230
| 6th Cir. | 2015Background
- Curtis Wheat, an African-American Fifth Third Bank employee, was involved in a verbal/physical workplace altercation with co-worker Brad Hatfield on Feb. 19, 2010; both were sent home that day.
- Wheat was told after an internal investigation that he was terminated for violating the bank’s workplace-violence and anti-harassment policies and core values; Hatfield initially received only a write-up and returned to work.
- Wheat filed an EEOC charge; the EEOC found reasonable cause and issued a right-to-sue letter. After further investigation, the bank later terminated Hatfield as well.
- Wheat sued under Title VII and the Ohio Civil Rights Act alleging racial discrimination in his termination.
- The district court, adopting a magistrate judge’s report, granted the bank summary judgment, finding Wheat failed to show a prima facie case (not similarly situated comparator) and failed to show pretext.
- The Sixth Circuit reversed, holding that (viewing all facts and inferences for Wheat) genuine disputes of material fact exist on comparator status and pretext, requiring resolution by a jury.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Wheat established a prima facie Title VII disparate-treatment case | Wheat: he is protected, qualified, suffered adverse action, and was treated less favorably than similarly situated non‑Black co‑worker Hatfield | Fifth Third: Wheat and Hatfield were not similarly situated (different duties; Wheat was aggressor; Wheat was rude in interview) | Court: Reversed — Wheat met the low prima facie burden; genuine disputes exist about similarity and who was aggressor |
| Whether the bank articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for termination | Wheat: reasons given (refusal to cooperate, threats, violence risk) were pretextual | Fifth Third: termination based on refusal to cooperate, threatening statements, and safety concerns | Court: Bank did articulate reasons (production burden met) but that does not end inquiry |
| Whether the bank’s stated reasons were pretext for discrimination | Wheat: inconsistencies and facts (Hatfield’s later termination, disputes over what was said, differing interviews) create triable issues of pretext | Fifth Third: actions were nonracial and based on conduct and safety concerns | Held: Reversed — Plaintiff produced sufficient evidence to raise genuine disputes as to whether reasons had basis in fact, actually motivated decision, or were insufficient; jury should decide |
| Proper standard on summary judgment in discrimination cases | Wheat: at summary stage courts must view all evidence and inferences in non‑movant’s favor and may find pretext issues sufficient to survive | Fifth Third: emphasized cases limiting inference from falsity alone | Held: Court reaffirmed burden‑shifting framework and that showing falsity or disputes over employer’s explanation can permit an inference of discrimination at summary judgment when viewed in plaintiff’s favor |
Key Cases Cited
- McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (framework for burden‑shifting in discrimination claims)
- Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (defendant’s production burden and continuing plaintiff burden)
- Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (plaintiff may rely on evidence that employer’s reasons are false to infer discrimination)
- St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (production vs. persuasion burdens; relevance to pretext analysis)
- Ercegovich v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 154 F.3d 344 (what it means to be similarly situated)
- Wexler v. White’s Fine Furniture, Inc., 317 F.3d 564 (three ways to show pretext)
- Chen v. Dow Chem. Co., 580 F.3d 394 (standard for whether falsity supports an inference at summary judgment)
- Laster v. City of Kalamazoo, 746 F.3d 714 (elements of prima facie discrimination case)
- Dodd v. Donahoe, 715 F.3d 151 (standard of review for summary judgment)
