Curtis Rookaird v. Bnsf Railway Company
908 F.3d 451
9th Cir.2018Background
- Curtis Rookaird was a BNSF conductor whose crew performed an air‑brake test on a 42‑car train on February 23, 2010; a supervising Trainmaster (Fortt) questioned the necessity of the test mid‑test, and Rookaird and his crew completed it.
- Later that shift supervisors relieved the crew early and, after an internal investigation, BNSF fired Rookaird for alleged inefficiency, dishonesty on his timesheet, failure to sign the timesheet, and failure to comply with instructions to leave property.
- Rookaird sued under the Federal Railroad Safety Act (FRSA), alleging BNSF retaliated in violation of 49 U.S.C. § 20109(a)(2) because he refused to stop a safety test he believed federal law required.
- The district court granted partial summary judgment for Rookaird on most prima facie elements but left the protected‑activity question to the jury; the jury found for Rookaird and awarded ~$1.2 million. BNSF appealed; Rookaird cross‑appealed damages.
- The Ninth Circuit considered (1) whether Rookaird engaged in FRSA‑protected activity (a good‑faith refusal to violate safety law) and (2) whether the air‑brake test was a contributing factor in his termination (prima facie and substantive stages under FRSA’s burden‑shifting framework).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Rookaird engaged in FRSA‑protected activity (refusal) | Rookaird refused (implicitly) a supervisor’s attempt to stop the air‑brake test and had a subjectively and objectively reasonable good‑faith belief the test was required | BNSF: No explicit order was given to stop the test; thus no "refusal" as a matter of law, and the test was not actually required so subsection (a)(2) does not apply | Court affirmed denial of JMOL: implicit supervisory conduct can amount to an order; substantial evidence supported a good‑faith, objectively reasonable belief that the test was required and thus protected activity |
| Whether FRSA (a)(2) requires the underlying conduct to be an actual violation | Rookaird: FRSA protects a good‑faith refusal to undertake conduct the employee reasonably believes would violate safety law, even if later shown not to be an actual violation | BNSF: (statutory) ¶(a)(2) applies only when the refused conduct would actually violate federal law; require adding “actually” before “violate” | Court rejected defendant’s narrower reading: the statute’s good‑faith requirement covers reasonable beliefs, so actual violation is not required for protection under ¶(a)(2) |
| Whether Rookaird made a prima facie showing that protected activity was a contributing factor | Rookaird: close temporal proximity, supervisor questioning, and cited inefficiency reason for firing allow inference of contribution | BNSF: provided non‑retaliatory reasons (timesheet issues, refusal to leave, dishonesty) that undermine inference | Court held Rookaird was entitled to summary judgment on the contributing‑factor element of the prima facie stage (inference established) |
| Whether Rookaird was entitled to summary judgment on the substantive contributing‑factor element (preponderance) | Rookaird: argued his protected activity in fact contributed to termination | BNSF: evidence (testimony from decisionmakers) that the air‑brake test did not factor in firing and other valid reasons existed | Court reversed district court’s summary judgment on the substantive element: genuine dispute of material fact exists and the substantive issue must go to the jury; vacated judgment and remanded |
Key Cases Cited
- First Nat’l Mortg. Co. v. Fed. Realty Inv. Tr., 631 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir.) (standard for JMOL review)
- Josephs v. Pac. Bell, 443 F.3d 1050 (9th Cir.) (JMOL and substantial‑evidence principles)
- Pavao v. Pagay, 307 F.3d 915 (9th Cir.) (verdict upheld if supported by substantial evidence)
- Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155 (U.S.) (refusal requires clear notice of demand in another context)
- Barnhart v. Peabody Coal Co., 537 U.S. 149 (U.S.) (limitations on expressio unius canon)
- Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (U.S.) (summary judgment and drawing inferences)
- Kuduk v. BNSF Ry. Co., 768 F.3d 786 (8th Cir.) (discussion of contributing‑factor at prima facie stage)
- Gunderson v. BNSF Ry. Co., 850 F.3d 962 (8th Cir.) (definition of contributing factor)
- Coppinger‑Martin v. Solis, 627 F.3d 745 (9th Cir.) (prima facie showing does not require proving employer’s motive conclusively)
- Koch Foods, Inc. v. Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 712 F.3d 476 (11th Cir.) (interpreting STAA without a good‑faith element — discussed and distinguished)