Curtis Croft v. Tarry Williams, 773 F.3d 170

Curtis Croft, sentenced as a juvenile (age 17) for murder, aggravated kidnapping, and aggravated sexual assault, received a natural life sentence without parole for murder.
Croft filed for permission to bring a successive 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petition arguing his life-without-parole sentence is unconstitutional under Miller v. Alabama.
Miller (2012) held mandatory life-without-parole sentences for juveniles violate the Eighth Amendment.
Croft admits Miller was decided after his sentence and thus must be shown to apply retroactively on collateral review to help him.
The Illinois Appellate Court concluded Croft’s life sentence was discretionary under Illinois law and that the sentencing court considered the presentence report (which addressed his age).
The district court declined to resolve Miller’s nationwide retroactivity dispute because Miller is inapplicable to Croft’s case given the discretionary nature of his sentence, and denied authorization to file the successive petition.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Retroactivity of Miller on collateral review	Miller should be applied retroactively to Croft’s case	Government disputed retroactivity in some circuits; split exists	Court did not decide retroactivity because Miller is inapplicable here
Applicability of Miller given state sentencing scheme	Miller applies because sentencing court failed to consider Croft's age, effectively treating sentence as mandatory	Illinois law makes life sentences discretionary; sentencing court considered presentence report including age	Miller inapplicable because Illinois sentence was discretionary and judge considered age via report
Whether omission to mention age transforms discretionary sentence into mandatory	Croft: omission means court treated sentence as required	State: omission does not convert discretion to mandate; judge explicitly considered report	Court rejected Croft’s theory; omission does not make sentence mandatory and record shows consideration of age
Authorization to file successive § 2254 petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(A)	Croft: prima facie showing that Miller entitles him to relief, so permission should be granted	State: Croft fails because Miller does not apply to discretionary life sentence; no new rule available to him	Authorization denied and application dismissed because Miller does not help Croft

Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012) (Eighth Amendment forbids mandatory life-without-parole sentences for juveniles)
In re Williams, 759 F.3d 66 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (permits successive petitions based on Miller retroactivity showing)
Evans-García v. United States, 744 F.3d 235 (1st Cir. 2014) (permits successive Miller-based collateral petitions)
In re Pendleton, 732 F.3d 280 (3d Cir. 2013) (authorizes successive petition where Miller may be retroactive)
Johnson v. United States, 720 F.3d 720 (8th Cir. 2013) (granted authorization; government conceded Miller retroactivity)
In re Morgan, 713 F.3d 1365 (11th Cir. 2013) (held Miller not retroactive on collateral review)
People v. Davis, 6 N.E.3d 709 (Ill. 2014) (Illinois decision holding Miller retroactive)
Chambers v. State, 831 N.W.2d 311 (Minn. 2013) (Minnesota decision holding Miller not retroactive)