Curran v. Secretary of Health and Human Services
130 Fed. Cl. 1
| Fed. Cl. | 2017Background
- Petitioner Jeff Curran filed a Vaccine Act petition alleging injury from an HPV vaccine; counsel filed a "bare bones" petition on July 29, 2015 to preserve the statute of limitations while medical records were still being collected.
- Counsel had begun obtaining records before filing and obtained the bulk of medical records in July–August 2015; some psychiatric records were received later in December 2015.
- Petitioner moved to voluntarily dismiss on February 8, 2016, acknowledging he likely could not meet his burden of proof; the special master dismissed the petition on February 16, 2016.
- Petitioner sought attorneys’ fees and costs totaling approximately $9,656 across initial and supplemental applications; the special master awarded only fees and costs incurred through August 31, 2015 (about $3,285.31).
- The special master found the petition had a minimal reasonable basis at filing (given impending limitations and ongoing record collection) but lost reasonable basis by August 31, 2015 once counsel had reviewed the medical records.
- The court affirmed the special master’s reasonable-basis findings but remanded to determine whether certain ‘‘wind-down’’ fees and costs (routine closing filings) incurred after August 2015 would have been necessarily incurred even had the case been terminated on the special master’s timeline.
Issues
| Issue | Curran's Argument | Government's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the petition had a reasonable basis at filing | Filing was justified because counsel was actively collecting records and filed to avoid the statute of limitations | Petition lacked affidavit/records and therefore never had a reasonable basis | Affirmed: reasonable basis existed at filing (just barely) due to imminent limitations and ongoing investigation |
| Whether reasonable basis persisted after counsel reviewed records | Counsel needed additional psychiatric records (received Dec. 2015); thus fees through dismissal are recoverable | Medical records available by Aug. 2015 showed longstanding conditions predating vaccine; no reasonable basis after that time | Affirmed: reasonable basis ceased by Aug. 31, 2015; fees after that date not presumptively recoverable |
| Entitlement to attorneys’ fees and costs for routine closing/wind-down tasks performed after Aug. 31, 2015 | Even on the Special Master’s timeline those routine filings would have been required; petitioner should recover those fees/costs | (Implicit) Those post–Aug. 2015 tasks were unnecessary because claim lacked reasonable basis then | Remanded: special master must decide whether those wind-down fees/costs would have been incurred even if case had been terminated at or before Aug. 31, 2015 |
| Standard of review for special master's fee decision | N/A (legal standard issue) | N/A | Court reviews special master for abuse of discretion; court applied that standard and found no abuse regarding reasonable-basis timing |
Key Cases Cited
- Chuisano v. United States, 116 Fed. Cl. 276 (2014) (reasonable-basis inquiry is objective, totality-of-circumstances, and not limited to filing date)
- McKellar v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 101 Fed. Cl. 297 (2011) (petitioner must affirmatively establish reasonable basis; lower burden than merits)
- Perreira v. Secretary of Department of Health & Human Services, 33 F.3d 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (reasonable-basis that ceases to exist cannot support continued maintenance of claim)
- Saxton v. Secretary, Department of Health & Human Services, 3 F.3d 1517 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (attorneys’ fees decision reviewed for abuse of discretion)
- Hines v. Secretary of Health & Human Services, 940 F.2d 1518 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (deferential standard where special master considered relevant evidence and stated rational basis)
- Ninestar Tech. Co. v. International Trade Commission, 667 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (standards for finding abuse of discretion)
