Cummings v. Premier Rehab Keller, 596 U.S. 212

Background

Petitioner Jane Cummings, who is deaf and legally blind and uses ASL, sought physical therapy and requested an American Sign Language interpreter; Premier Rehab refused and offered alternative communications instead.
Cummings sued under the Rehabilitation Act §504 and the ACA §1557, alleging disability discrimination; Premier Rehab is subject to those Spending Clause statutes because it receives Medicare/Medicaid reimbursement.
The District Court dismissed the complaint after finding Cummings alleged only humiliation, frustration, and emotional distress and concluding emotional‑distress damages are not recoverable under those statutes; the Fifth Circuit affirmed.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether emotional‑distress damages are available in private suits enforcing Spending Clause antidiscrimination statutes.
The Court applied the Spending Clause “contract‑analogy” (Pennhurst/Barnes/Gebser/Arlington): a remedy is available only if a prospective funding recipient had clear notice it would face that form of liability by accepting federal funds.
Holding: emotional‑distress damages are not recoverable under the Rehabilitation Act or ACA because such damages are not a remedy "traditionally available" for breach of contract and any Restatement exception is not sufficiently uniform to supply the requisite clear notice.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether compensatory damages for emotional distress are available under Spending Clause antidiscrimination statutes (Rehabilitation Act §504; ACA §1557)	Cummings: yes — Spending Clause suits may include contract‑law remedies, and contract authorities (Restatement §353) permit emotional‑distress damages where a breach is likely to cause serious emotional disturbance (discrimination is such a breach).	Premier Rehab / Government: no — under the Court's contract‑analogy a remedy is available only if it is traditionally or normally available for breach of contract; emotional‑distress damages are generally not recoverable.	SCOTUS: No — emotional‑distress damages are not recoverable because funding recipients lacked the clear notice required under Spending Clause precedent.
Whether courts may import narrow or exceptional contract‑law rules (e.g., Restatement §353) to supply notice of remedies under Spending Clause statutes	Cummings: courts should apply fine‑grained, context‑specific contract exceptions that govern when a breach is likely to cause emotional harm.	Respondent/majority: Barnes limits the analogy to remedies "traditionally" or "normally" available in contract; importing rare or idiosyncratic exceptions would defeat the notice/consent rationale and risk judicial law‑making.	SCOTUS: Barnes controls — exceptional or split contract rules do not give the clear notice required; therefore emotional‑distress damages are not implied. (Concurring opinion favors separation‑of‑powers restraint; dissent would extend recovery.)

Key Cases Cited

Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981) (Spending Clause conditions are like a contract; clear notice required).
Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181 (2002) (Spending Clause suits permit remedies traditionally available in contract; punitive damages not available).
Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. School Dist., 524 U.S. 274 (1998) (contract‑analogy and notice in Spending Clause discrimination suits).
Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Ed. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291 (2006) (Congress must provide clear notice of conditions and remedies attached to federal funds).
Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979) (implied private right of action under Title IX).
Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001) (analysis of implied rights and remedies).
Franklin v. Gwinnett County Pub. Sch., 503 U.S. 60 (1992) (monetary relief available for intentional violations of Title IX).
Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299 (1986) (compensatory damages may "make good the wrong done" in civil‑rights context).