Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170

Pinholster participated in a 1982 burglary that killed two men; he was convicted of two counts of first‑degree murder and sentenced to death.
At trial, guilt phase featured Pinholster testifying with an alibi; penalty phase emphasized aggravating conduct and limited mitigation, with counsel presenting little mitigation evidence.
The trial court allowed aggravating evidence despite a notice issue under Cal. Penal Code § 190.3; defense offered minimal mitigation (primarily Pinholster’s mother) and did not call psychiatric experts.
Pinholster pursued state habeas petitions alleging ineffective penalty‑phase representation; California Supreme Court denied relief on the merits in both petitions.
Federal habeas proceedings included an evidentiary hearing where new mental‑health evidence was presented; the District Court granted relief under pre‑AEDPA standards, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed en banc.
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that review under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) is limited to the state‑court record and that new evidence from a federal hearing cannot be used to expand the § 2254(d)(1) record; § 2254(e)(2) remains applicable for new evidence.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Scope of § 2254(d)(1) review	Pinholster contends federal court may consider new evidence from a § 2254(d)(1) inquiry.	State contends review is confined to the state‑court record.	Review limited to the state‑court record.
Effect of AEDPA evidentiary hearing on § 2254(d)(1)	Federal hearing evidence should inform the § 2254(d)(1) analysis.	New evidence from an evidentiary hearing cannot alter the state‑court record for § 2254(d)(1).	District‑court evidence cannot be used to satisfy § 2254(d)(1) review; remand unnecessary.
Whether California Supreme Court unreasonably applied Strickland	Counsel’s investigation and presentation of mitigation were deficient and prejudicial under Strickland.	California Supreme Court reasonably applied Strickland to the state‑court record.	California Supreme Court did not unreasonably apply Strickland.
Prejudice from alleged penalty‑phase deficiencies	New mitigating evidence could have changed the balancing against death.	Even with deficiencies, the evidence does not show a reasonable probability of a different outcome.	Not persuaded that prejudice established under Strickland.
Remand vs. direct decision on the state record	Case should be remanded for properly limited § 2254(d)(1) review with the new evidence.	Remand unnecessary; the state record suffices to deny relief.	Remand inappropriate; decision rests on state‑court record.

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (U.S. 1984) (establishes standard for ineffective assistance and prejudice)
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (U.S. 2011) (doubly deferential review under § 2254(d))
Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (U.S. 2000) (definest § 2254(d)(1) inquiry: correct principle applied to facts)
Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465 (U.S. 2007) (AEDPA and evidentiary hearings framework)
Michael Williams, 529 U.S. 420 (U.S. 2000) (AEDPA(e) evidentiary hearing and diligence standards)
Holland v. Jackson, 542 U.S. 649 (U.S. 2004) (state‑court record scope under § 2254(d)(1))
Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374 (U.S. 2005) (limits of mitigation investigation and prejudice)
Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510 (U.S. 2003) (duty to investigate and impact of investigation on prejudice)
Terry Williams, 529 U.S. 362 (U.S. 2000) (application of Strickland and deference in prejudice analysis)