35 Cal. App. 5th 1109
Cal. Ct. App. 5th2019Background
- Cuevas-Martinez was sued by his former employers (the Nuranis/Sun Salt Sand, Inc.) alleging six causes of action (trade-secret misappropriation, interference with prospective economic advantage and contractual relations, conversion, unfair business practices, injunctive relief) after he opened a competing restaurant; trial court granted summary judgment for Cuevas-Martinez on all claims.
- Cuevas-Martinez then sued the Nuranis and their attorney for malicious prosecution; defendants moved to strike under California's anti‑SLAPP statute (§ 425.16) arguing the prior suit was protected activity and Cuevas‑Martinez could not show a probability of prevailing.
- At the anti‑SLAPP hearing the trial judge relied on Jarrow to conclude that summary judgment alone does not establish lack of probable cause and granted the motion, awarding defendants fees; Cuevas‑Martinez appealed.
- On appeal Cuevas‑Martinez submitted the summary judgment record and discovery responses (including testimony that Grill‑A‑Burger had no supplier contracts and previous owners saying the recipe document was public), arguing these materials show respondents lacked probable cause and acted with malice.
- The Court of Appeal reviewed de novo, applied the anti‑SLAPP "minimal merit"/summary‑judgment‑like standard, and held that because a malicious‑prosecution cause of action vindicates a single primary right, proof of lack of probable cause on any one theory suffices to defeat a motion to strike.
- The appellate court found prima facie evidence defendants lacked probable cause (at least for the supplier‑interference and trade‑secret claims) and inferred malice from continued prosecution despite discovery showing no supplier contracts and refutation of trade‑secret allegations; it reversed the anti‑SLAPP ruling and fee award.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Jarrow bars using the summary‑judgment record to show lack of probable cause | Cuevas‑Martinez: he relied on the underlying summary‑judgment evidence and discovery responses, not just the minute order, to show lack of probable cause | Respondents: summary judgment for insufficient evidence does not, by itself, prove lack of probable cause (Jarrow) | Court: Jarrow does not bar use of the full record; presenting the evidence that was before the trial court can establish minimal merit for malicious prosecution under anti‑SLAPP review |
| Whether respondents had probable cause for specific claims (supplier‑contract interference; trade‑secret misappropriation) | Cuevas‑Martinez: discovery and custodial affidavits showed Grill‑A‑Burger had no supplier contracts; prior owners said recipes were not confidential, and the Nuranis produced no purchase agreement proving payment for trade secrets | Respondents: claims relied on testimonial disputes and differing interpretations; probable cause persisted until conclusively eliminated | Court: Probable cause was lacking for at least two theories — interference with contractual relations (no supplier contracts) and trade‑secret claim (previous owners refuted secrecy and no purchase agreement produced) |
| Whether malice can be inferred | Cuevas‑Martinez: defendants continued to prosecute baseless claims over 20+ months and Farouk expressed intent to "get back" at Cuevas‑Martinez; conduct supports inference of improper purpose | Respondents: denied improper motive; argued litigation was supported by testimonial evidence | Court: Malice may be inferred from continued prosecution after discovery revealed lack of probable cause and from circumstantial evidence of improper motive |
| Scope of anti‑SLAPP when a malicious‑prosecution cause pleads multiple theories | Cuevas‑Martinez: a single malicious‑prosecution cause vindicates one primary right; showing merit as to any pleaded theory defeats the motion | Respondents: (argued below) could strip parts of cause; Baral discussed piecemeal striking for mixed claims | Court: Under primary‑rights/Oasis, if any part of a wholly protected claim has minimal merit, the entire cause stands; Baral inapplicable because malicious‑prosecution is entirely protected activity |
Key Cases Cited
- Jarrow Formulas, Inc. v. LaMarche, 31 Cal.4th 728 (2003) (entry of defense summary judgment for insufficient evidence does not automatically establish lack of probable cause for malicious prosecution)
- Soukup v. Law Offices of Herbert Hafif, 39 Cal.4th 260 (2006) (anti‑SLAPP plaintiff must make a prima facie showing under a summary‑judgment‑like standard; draw favorable inferences from plaintiff's evidence)
- Navellier v. Sletten, 29 Cal.4th 82 (2002) (anti‑SLAPP requires plaintiff to show minimal merit/probability of prevailing)
- Crowley v. Katleman, 8 Cal.4th 666 (1994) (malicious‑prosecution primary‑rights analysis: plaintiff must show lack of probable cause for each theory underlying the prior action)
- Oasis West Realty, LLC v. Goldman, 51 Cal.4th 811 (2011) (if any part of a cause of action arising from protected activity has merit, the entire cause survives an anti‑SLAPP motion)
- Zamos v. Stroud, 32 Cal.4th 958 (2004) (malicious prosecution requires termination in plaintiff's favor, lack of probable cause, and malice; malice may be inferred from continued prosecution after lack of probable cause is known)
- Baral v. Schnitt, 1 Cal.5th 376 (2016) (addresses piecemeal striking for mixed causes of action but is limited to claims that mix protected and unprotected activity)